Related papers: Long Range Games
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
We study Nash equilibria for the deterministic ergodic N-players game. We introduce pure strategies, mixed strategies and Nash equilibria associated with those. We show that a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and it is a Mather…
We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…
We study stationary mean field games with singular controls in which the representative player interacts with a long-time weighted average of the population through a discounted and an ergodic performance criterion. This class of games…
We show that equilibria of a sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG) can be adopted by players in corresponding large but finite dynamic games to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such equilibria in the form of random…
Mean field games is a recent area of study introduced by Lions and Lasry in a series of seminal papers in 2006. Mean field games model situations of competition between large number of rational agents that play non-cooperative dynamic games…
In this paper we study mean field games with possibly multiple mean field equilibria. Instead of focusing on the individual equilibria, we propose to study the set of values over all possible equilibria, which we call the set value of the…
Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are…
This paper investigates the so-called asymptotic solvability problem in linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games. The model has asymptotic solvability if for all sufficiently large population sizes, the corresponding game has a set of…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We define and analyze the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium for nonatomic aggregative games with an infinity of players types. These equilibria are characterized through an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. We show, under…
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…
In the framework of continuous time symmetric stochastic differential games in open loop strategies, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called coarse correlated solution. This can be seen as the analogue of a coarse…
We study a class of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games in which each player interacts directly only with its nearest neighbors in a given graph. We find a semi-explicit Markovian equilibrium for any transitive graph, in terms of…
In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the…
Mean field games are concerned with the limit of large-population stochastic differential games where the agents interact through their empirical distribution. In the classical setting, the number of players is large but fixed throughout…
We consider a mean field game describing the limit of a stochastic differential game of $N$-players whose state dynamics are subject to idiosyncratic and common noise and that can be absorbed when they hit a prescribed region of the state…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
This paper studies social interactions in a game theoretic model with players in a large social network. We consider observations from one single equilibrium of a large network game with asymmetric information, in which each player chooses…