Related papers: Computing Ex Ante Equilibrium in Heterogeneous Zer…

In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…

In stochastic dynamic environments, team Markov games have emerged as a versatile paradigm for studying sequential decision-making problems of fully cooperative multi-agent systems. However, the optimality of the derived policies is usually…

This paper studies two-player zero-sum stochastic Bayesian games where each player has its own dynamic state that is unknown to the other player. Using typical techniques, we provide the recursive formulas and sufficient statistics in both…

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is increasingly used to design learning-enabled agents that interact in shared environments. However, training MARL algorithms in general-sum games remains challenging: learning dynamics can become…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

The standard problem setting in cooperative multi-agent settings is self-play (SP), where the goal is to train a team of agents that works well together. However, optimal SP policies commonly contain arbitrary conventions ("handshakes") and…

We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…

The double oracle algorithm is a popular method of solving games, because it is able to reduce computing equilibria to computing a series of best responses. However, its theoretical properties are not well understood. In this paper, we…

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…

This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…

We consider the problem of computing stationary points in min-max optimization, with a particular focus on the special case of computing Nash equilibria in (two-)team zero-sum games. We first show that computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria…

The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not…

We extend anytime constraints to the Markov game setting and the corresponding solution concept of an anytime-constrained equilibrium (ACE). Then, we present a comprehensive theory of anytime-constrained equilibria that includes (1) a…

Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…

We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…

This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…

Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…