Related papers: Mechanism Design for Congested Facility Location
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…
Scheduling a sports tournament is a complex optimization problem, which requires a large number of hard constraints to satisfy. Despite the availability of several such constraints in the literature, there remains a gap since most of the…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that…
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…
In this paper, we study a facility location problem within a competitive market context, where customer demand is predicted by a random utility choice model. Unlike prior research, which primarily focuses on simple constraints such as a…
We present an approach to couple the resolution of Combinatorial Optimization problems with methods from Machine Learning, applied to the single source, capacitated, facility location problem. Our study is framed in the context where a…
In traditional facility location problems, a set of points is provided, and the objective is to determine the best location for a new facility based on criteria such as minimizing cost, time, and distances between clients and facilities.…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players. It contributes to the line of work initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [EC09] on approximate mechanism design without money.…
This paper studies a class of distributed online convex optimization problems for heterogeneous linear multi-agent systems. Agents in a network, knowing only their own outputs, need to minimize the time-varying costs through neighboring…
In this paper, we study of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on the line from a Bayesian Mechanism Design perspective and propose a novel class of mechanisms: the \textit{Extended Ranking Mechanisms} (ERMs). We first…
Fraud can pose a challenge in many resource allocation domains, including social service delivery and credit provision. For example, agents may misreport private information in order to gain benefits or access to credit. To mitigate this, a…
The recent large scale availability of mobility data, which captures individual mobility patterns, poses novel operational problems that are exciting and challenging. Motivated by this, we introduce and study a variant of the…
This paper studies distributed resource allocation problem in multi-agent systems, where all the agents cooperatively minimize the sum of their cost functions with global resource constraints over stochastic communication networks. This…
Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to different machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally induces a game among the selfish job owners. The…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
The \textit{facility location} problem consists of a set of \textit{facilities} $\mathcal{F}$, a set of \textit{clients} $\mathcal{C}$, an \textit{opening cost} $f_i$ associated with each facility $x_i$, and a \textit{connection cost}…
We study the problem of design of strategyproof in expectation (SP) mechanisms for facility location on a cycle, with the objective of minimizing the sum of costs of $n$ agents. We show that there exists an SP mechanism that attains an…
We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space, and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms…