Related papers: Dynamic Competition for Attention
The literature in modern machine learning has only negative results for learning to communicate between competitive agents using standard RL. We introduce a modified sender-receiver game to study the spectrum of partially-competitive…
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…
We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one that has to make the hiring decision. The…
We consider the disclosure problem of a sender with a large data set of hard evidence who wants to persuade a receiver to take higher actions. Because the receiver will make inferences based on the distribution of the data they see, the…
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some.…
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. An…
We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that…
The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…
I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before…
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifiably disclose to a receiver. The receiver does not know how…
This paper concerns sequential hypothesis testing in competitive multi-agent systems where agents exchange potentially manipulated information. Specifically, a two-agent scenario is studied where each agent aims to correctly infer the true…
In distributed wireless networks, nodes often do not know the topology (network size, connectivity and the channel gains) of the network. Thus, they have to compute their transmission and reception parameters in a distributed fashion. In…
We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…
A decision-maker periodically acquires information about a changing state, controlling both the timing and content of updates. I characterize optimal policies using a decomposition of the dynamic problem into optimal stopping and static…
Competitive interactions represent one of the driving forces behind evolution and natural selection in biological and sociological systems. For example, animals in an ecosystem may vie for food or mates; in a market economy, firms may…