Related papers: Stackelberg Attack on Protocol Fee Governance
Smart contracts are programs that are executed on a blockhain. They have been used for applications in voting, decentralized finance, and supply chain management. However, vulnerabilities in smart contracts have been abused by hackers,…
The asset trading volume on blockchain-based exchanges (DEX) increased substantially since the advent of Automated Market Makers (AMM). Yet, AMMs and their forks compete on the same blockchain, incurring unnecessary network and block-space…
This paper studies the dynamic pricing mechanism for data products in demand-driven markets through a game-theoretic framework. We develop a three-tier Stackelberg game model to capture the hierarchical strategic interactions among key…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a cornerstone of decentralized finance. They are smart contracts (stateful programs) running on blockchains. They enable virtual token exchange: traders swap tokens with the AMM for a fee, while liquidity…
In this paper, we introduce a novel framework to model the exchange rate dynamics between two intrinsically linked cryptoassets, such as stablecoins pegged to the same fiat currency or a liquid staking token and its associated native token.…
This paper explores an idea of demand-supply balance for smart grids in which consumers are expected to play a significant role. The main objective is to motivate the consumer, by maximizing their benefit both as a seller and a buyer, to…
The problem of dynamic pricing of electricity in a retail market is considered. A Stackelberg game is used to model interactions between a retailer and its customers; the retailer sets the day-ahead hourly price of electricity and consumers…
Front-running attacks have been a major concern on the blockchain. Attackers launch front-running attacks by inserting additional transactions before upcoming victim transactions to manipulate victim transaction executions and make profits.…
We study linking attacks on communication protocols. We show that an active attacker is strictly more powerful in this setting than previously-considered passive attackers. We introduce a formal model to reason about active linkability…
Due to the ever-increasing popularity of ride-hailing services and the indisputable shift towards alternative fuel vehicles, the intersection of the ride-hailing market and smart electric mobility provides an opportunity to trade different…
In this work, we reexamine the vulnerability of Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) to bribing attacks, where an adversary incentivizes blockchain miners to deliberately ignore a specific transaction to undermine the punishment mechanism of…
In this work, a novel Stackelberg game theoretic framework is proposed for trading energy bidirectionally between the demand-response (DR) aggregator and the prosumers. This formulation allows for flexible energy arbitrage and additional…
This paper studies liquid staking tokens (LSTs) on automated market makers (AMMs), both theoretically and empirically. LSTs are tokenized representations of staked assets on proof-of-stake blockchains. First, we model LST-liquidity on AMMs…
There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…
The developers of Ethereum smart contracts often implement administrating patterns, such as censoring certain users, creating or destroying balances on demand, destroying smart contracts, or injecting arbitrary code. These routines turn an…
We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader-follower…
Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the…
This paper introduces a trade ordering rule that aims to reduce intra-block price volatility in Automated Market Maker (AMM) powered decentralized exchanges. The ordering rule introduced here, Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR),…
In this paper, we describe a novel agent-based approach for modelling the transaction cost of buying or selling an asset in financial markets, e.g., to liquidate a large position as a result of a margin call to meet financial obligations.…
As a trusted middleware connecting the blockchain and the real world, the blockchain oracle can obtain trusted real-time price information for financial applications such as payment and settlement, and asset valuation on the blockchain.…