Related papers: Rent Division with Picky Roommates
In this paper, we present new results on the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents whose preferences correspond to {\em matroid rank functions}. This is a versatile valuation class with several desirable properties…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…
We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among $n$ agents, hopefully in a fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive guarantees are also necessary, and the problem of designing fair…
We consider the design of mechanisms that allocate limited resources among self-interested agents using neural networks. Unlike the recent works that leverage machine learning for revenue maximization in auctions, we consider welfare…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost. A learner can only…
House allocation refers to the problem where $m$ houses are to be allocated to $n$ agents so that each agent receives one house. Since an envy-free house allocation does not always exist, we consider finding such an allocation in the…
Envy-free up to one good (EF1) and envy-free up to any good (EFX) are two well-known extensions of envy-freeness for the case of indivisible items. It is shown that EF1 can always be guaranteed for agents with subadditive valuations. In…
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods, while Pareto optimality…
We study the approximability of the maximum size independent set (MIS) problem in bounded degree graphs. This is one of the most classic and widely studied NP-hard optimization problems. We focus on the well known minimum degree greedy…
Thick two-sided matching platforms, such as the room-rental market, face the challenge of showing relevant objects to users to reduce search costs. Many platforms use ranking algorithms to determine the order in which alternatives are shown…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
Explore-and-exploit tradeoffs play a key role in recommendation systems (RSs), aiming at serving users better by learning from previous interactions. Despite their commercial success, the societal effects of explore-and-exploit mechanisms…
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study welfare guarantees and complexity in this model with respect…
Given a graph $G$, a non-negative integer $k$, and a weight function that maps each vertex in $G$ to a positive real number, the \emph{Maximum Weighted Budgeted Independent Set (MWBIS) problem} is about finding a maximum weighted…
The Maximum Weight Independent Set (MWIS) problem on finite undirected graphs with vertex weights asks for a set of pairwise nonadjacent vertices of maximum weight sum. MWIS is one of the most investigated and most important algorithmic…
We consider the problem of assigning agents to resources under the two-sided preference list model where resources specify an upper-quota and a lower-quota, that is, respectively the maximum and minimum number of agents that can be assigned…
We study fair division of indivisible mixed manna (items whose values may be positive, negative, or zero) among agents with additive valuations. Here, we establish that fairness -- in terms of a relaxation of envy-freeness -- and Pareto…
We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…