Related papers: Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: B…
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the…
We study the communication complexity of linear algebraic problems over finite fields in the multi-player message passing model, proving a number of tight lower bounds. Specifically, for a matrix which is distributed among a number of…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing…
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…
Consider the "Number in Hand" multiparty communication complexity model, where k players holding inputs x_1,...,x_k in {0,1}^n communicate to compute the value f(x_1,...,x_k) of a function f known to all of them. The main lower bound…
We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit…
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…
Lifting theorems are one of the most powerful tools for proving communication lower bounds, with numerous downstream applications in proof complexity, monotone circuit lower bounds, data structures, and combinatorial optimization. However,…
The competition complexity of an auction setting is the number of additional bidders needed such that the simple mechanism of selling items separately (with additional bidders) achieves greater revenue than the optimal but complex…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder $i$ has a private value $v_i$, a budget $b_i$, and is interested in all the items in $S_i$. The value to agent $i$ of a set of items $R$ is $|R \cap S_i| \cdot v_i$. Such…
In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…
This paper studies the use of a multi-attribute auction in a communication system to bring about efficient relaying in a non-cooperative setting. We consider a system where a source seeks to offload data to an access point (AP) while…
In diffusion auctions, sellers can leverage an underlying social network to broaden participation, thereby increasing their potential revenue. Specifically, sellers can incentivise participants in their auction to diffuse information about…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
We study whether large language models acting as autonomous bidders can tacitly collude by coordinating when to accept platform posted payouts in repeated Dutch auctions, without any communication. We present a minimal repeated auction…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
We study the one-way two-party communication complexity of Maximum Matching in the semi-robust setting where the edges of a maximum matching are randomly partitioned between Alice and Bob, but all remaining edges of the input graph are…