Related papers: Inertial Coordination Games
We consider a class of $N$-player games and mean-field games of singular controls with ergodic performance criterion, providing a benchmark case for irreversible investment games featuring mean-field interaction and strategic…
Distributed decision-makers are modeled as players in a game with two levels. High level decisions concern the game environment and determine the willingness of the players to form a coalition (or group). Low level decisions involve the…
A non-zero-sum 3-person coalition game is presented, to study the evolution of complexity and diversity in cooperation, where the population dynamics of players with strategies is given according to their scores in the iterated game and…
To improve efficiency and reduce failures in autonomous vehicles, research has focused on developing robust and safe learning methods that take into account disturbances in the environment. Existing literature in robust reinforcement…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
In common-interest stochastic games all players receive an identical payoff. Players participating in such games must learn to coordinate with each other in order to receive the highest-possible value. A number of reinforcement learning…
The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years…
The behaviour of multi-agent learning in many player games has been shown to display complex dynamics outside of restrictive examples such as network zero-sum games. In addition, it has been shown that convergent behaviour is less likely to…
In this paper, the known deterministic linear-quadratic Stackelberg game is revisited, whose open-loop Stackelberg solution actually possesses the nature of time inconsistency. To handle this time inconsistency, {a two-tier game framework…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
We investigate systematically the impact of human intervention in the training of computer players in a strategy board game. In that game, computer players utilise reinforcement learning with neural networks for evolving their playing…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices. We consider the following categories of participants: (I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable…
Cooperation in heterogeneous groups, where individuals differ in resources, productivity, and behavioural responsiveness, underpins collective action across many social and biological systems. Introspection dynamics, in which each player…
A variety of practical problems can be modeled by the decision-making process in multi-player games where a group of self-interested players aim at optimizing their own local objectives, while the objectives depend on the actions taken by…
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called `stochastic slowdown' effect, previously observed in (Altrock et. al, 2010) for simple evolutionary dynamics. Slowdown here refers to the fact that a…
In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…
Social institutions are systems of shared norms and rules that regulate people's behaviors, often emerging without external enforcement. They provide criteria to distinguish cooperation from defection and establish rules to sustain…