Related papers: Fixed-budget and Multiple-issue Quadratic Voting
Cumulative and quadratic voting are two distributional voting methods that are expressive, promoting fairness and inclusion, particularly in the realm of participatory budgeting. Despite these benefits, graphical voter interfaces for…
We discuss an algorithmic intervention aimed at increasing equity and economic efficiency at a crowdfunding platform that gives cash subsidies to grantees. Through a blend of technical and qualitative methods, we show that the previous…
Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii)…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric…
We propose a set of protocols for quantum anonymous veto (QAV) broadly categorized under the probabilistic, iterative, and deterministic schemes. The schemes are based upon different types of quantum resources. Specifically, they may be…
Voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a centralized clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. The net payoff to an agent with utility $u$ who purchases $v$ votes is $\Psi (S_{n+1})u-v^{2}$, where…
We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size…
We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost and each voter assigns to each item a certain value. The goal is to…
When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…
Quantum Anonymous Veto (QAV) protocols enable secure and anonymous decision-making by allowing participants to detect the presence of a veto without revealing individual choices. While existing QAV schemes offer strong theoretical…
Voting mechanisms are widely accepted and used methods for decentralized decision-making. Ensuring the acceptance of the voting mechanism's outcome is a crucial characteristic of robust voting systems. Consider this scenario: A group of…
Variational Quantum Algorithms (VQAs) are promising methods for solving combinatorial optimization problems on noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) devices. However, benchmarking VQAs is difficult due to their stochastic behavior and the…
We designed two rules of binary quantum computed vote: Quantum Logical Veto (QLV) and Quantum Logical Nomination (QLN). The conjunction and disjunction from quantum computational logic are used to define QLV and QLN, respectively. Compared…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investigates how accurately a winning committee can be approximated…
Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum…
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
This paper investigates the social optimum for a dynamic linear quadratic collective choice problem where a group of agents choose among multiple alternatives or destinations. The agents' common objective is to minimize the average cost of…
We present a quantum algorithm for European option pricing in finance, where the key idea is to work in the unary representation of the asset value. The algorithm needs novel circuitry and is divided in three parts: first, the amplitude…