Related papers: The Value of Ambiguous Commitments in Multi-Follow…

We consider the problem of efficiently learning to play single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games when the leader lacks knowledge of the lower-level game. Such games arise in hierarchical decision-making problems involving…

Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by…

In this paper we characterize the niveloidal preferences that satisfy the Weak Order, Monotonicity, Archimedean, and Weak C-Independence Axioms from the point of view of an intra-personal, leader-follower game. We also show that the…

In the original Parrondo game, a single player combines two losing strategies to a winning strategy. In this paper we investigate the question what happens, if two or more players play Parrondo games in a coordinated way. We introduce a…

In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…

We address two-player general-sum stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where the leader's policy is optimized considering the best-response follower whose policy is optimal for its reward under the leader. Existing policy gradient and value…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Common knowledge is crucial for safe group coordination. In its absence, humans must rely on shared knowledge, which is inherently limited in depth and therefore prone to coordination failures, because any finite-order knowledge attribution…

In this paper, the two-player leader-follower game with private inputs for feedback Stackelberg strategy is considered. In particular, the follower shares its measurement information with the leader except its historical control inputs…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…

In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…

We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…

We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…

We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris (1999)), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about…

This paper is concerned with a three-level multi-leader-follower incentive Stackelberg game with $H_\infty$ constraint. Based on $H_2/H_\infty$ control theory, we firstly obtain the worst-case disturbance and the team-optimal strategy by…

We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject to a single sum resource…

Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous…