Related papers: The Value of Ambiguous Commitments in Multi-Follow…

In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…

In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…

Inverse game theory is utilized to infer the cost functions of all players based on game outcomes. However, existing inverse game theory methods do not consider the learner as an active participant in the game, which could significantly…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…

We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…

This paper studies an instance of zero-sum games in which one player (the leader) commits to its opponent (the follower) to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy). The actions of the leader are observed by the…

We experimentally study a game in which success requires a sufficient total contribution by members of a group. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the chance and the total effort required for success. A theoretical model with…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…

In a Stackelberg network pricing game, a leader sets prices for a given subset of edges so as to maximize profit, after which one or multiple followers choose a shortest path from their source to sink. We study the counter-intuitive…

Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…

How important are leaders' actions in facilitating coordination? In this paper, we investigate their signaling role in a global games framework. A perfectly informed leader and a team of followers face a coordination problem. Despite the…

The achievement of common goals through voluntary efforts of members of a group can be challenged by the high temptation of individual defection. Here, two-person one-goal assurance games are generalized to N-person, M-goal achievement…

In this paper, we study the existence of equilibrium in a single-leader-multiple-follower game with decision-dependent chance constraints (DDCCs), where decision-dependent uncertainties (DDUs) exist in the constraints of followers. DDUs…

This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…