Related papers: Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Parti…
Although NP-Complete problems are the most difficult decisional problems, it is possible to discover in them polynomial (or easy) observables. We study the Graph Partitioning Problem showing that it is possible to recognize in it two…
A large body of research is currently investigating on the connection between machine learning and game theory. In this work, game theory notions are injected into a preference learning framework. Specifically, a preference learning problem…
We introduce the probabilistic two-agent justification logic IPJ, a logic in which we can reason about agents that perform interactive proofs. In order to study the growth rate of the probabilities in IPJ, we present a new method of…
In this paper we consider two variants of the Secretary problem: The Best-or-Worst and the Postdoc problems. We extend previous work by considering that the number of objects is not known and follows either a discrete Uniform distribution…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
We study coalition formation in the framework of hedonic games. There, a set of agents needs to be partitioned into disjoint coalitions, where agents have a preference order over coalitions. A partition is called popular if it does not lose…
We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable…
What does it mean for an algorithm to be fair? Different papers use different notions of algorithmic fairness, and although these appear internally consistent, they also seem mutually incompatible. We present a mathematical setting in which…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…
There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategize. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which the set of strategic…
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019,…
Algorithms with predictions is a recent framework for decision-making under uncertainty that leverages the power of machine-learned predictions without making any assumption about their quality. The goal in this framework is for algorithms…
Coalition logic is one of the most popular logics for multi-agent systems. While epistemic extensions of coalition logic have received much attention, existence of their complete axiomatisations has so far been an open problem. In this…
This paper experimentally evaluates four mechanisms intended to achieve the Uniform outcome in rationing problems (Sprumont, 1991). Our benchmark is the dominant-strategy, direct-revelation mechanism of the Uniform rule. A strategically…
We study the strong core of housing markets when agents' preferences over houses are expressed as partial orders. We provide a structural characterization of the strong core, and propose an efficient algorithm that finds an allocation in…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitarian mechanism is, in fact, peak group strategyproof : no…
Given an undirected graph representing similarities between a set of items and an additive measure evaluating the items, we treat the position of a special subset of items in an ordinal ranking through a collection of combinatorial…