Related papers: Multiplayer Games of War

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

We construct and study the transition probability matrix of evolutionary games in which the number of players is finite (and relatively small) of such games. We use a simplified version of the population games studied by Sandholm. After…

The containment game is a full information game for two players, initialised with a set of occupied vertices in an infinite connected graph $G$. On the $t$-th turn, the first player, called Spreader, extends the occupied set to $g(t)$…

Consider $N$ players and $K$ games taking place simultaneously. Each of these games is modeled as a Tug-of-War (ToW) game where increasing the action of one player decreases the reward for all other players. Each player participates in only…

We consider learning by fictitious play in a large population of agents engaged in single-play, two-person rounds of a symmetric game, and derive a mean-filed type model for the corresponding stochastic process. Using this model, we…

A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…

This paper studies a war of attrition game in the setting of public good provision that combines three elements: (i) multiple players, (ii) incomplete information, and (iii) ex-ante asymmetry. In the unique equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a…

We study mean field games and corresponding $N$-player games in continuous time over a finite time horizon where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space. As opposed to previous works on finite state mean field games, we…

We develop the fictitious play algorithm in the context of the linear programming approach for mean field games of optimal stopping and mean field games with regular control and absorption. This algorithm allows to approximate the mean…

We study the multi-strategy stochastic evolutionary game with death-birth updating in expanding spatial populations of size $N\to \infty$. The model is a voter model perturbation. For typical populations, we require perturbation strengths…

Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…

We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…

A partially parallel dynamical noisy binary choice (Ising) game in discrete time of $N$ players on complete graphs with $k$ players having a possibility of changing their strategies at each time moment called $k$-flip Ising game is…

It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…

Stochastic games are a natural model for the synthesis of controllers confronted to adversarial and/or random actions. In particular, $\omega$-regular games of infinite length can represent reactive systems which are not expected to reach a…

In Gambler's Ruin when both players start with the same amount of money, we show the playing time stochastically increases when the games are made more fair. We give two different arguments for this fact that extend results from…

We study so-called invariant games played with a fixed number $d$ of heaps of matches. A game is described by a finite list $\mathcal{M}$ of integer vectors of length $d$ specifying the legal moves. A move consists in changing the current…

In this work we discuss a random Tug-of-War game in graphs where one of the players has the power to decide at each turn whether to play a round of classical random Tug-of-War, or let the other player choose the new game position in…