Related papers: Detection of False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) o…
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are a significant threat to modern power systems. Although numerous research studies have focused on FDI attacks on power systems, these studies have primarily concentrated on designing or detecting DC FDI…
Automatic generation control (AGC) systems play a crucial role in maintaining system frequency across power grids. However, AGC systems' reliance on communicated measurements exposes them to false data injection attacks (FDIAs), which can…
We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…
Introduction of PMUs to cyber-physical system pro-vides accurate data acquisition, while posing additional risk of being the victim of cyber attack. Both False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) and GPS-spoofing or timing attack can provide…
Motivated by the sequential detection of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in a dynamic smart grid, we consider a more general problem of sequentially detecting time-varying FDIAs in dynamic linear regression models. The unknown…
The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…
Power grids increasingly need real-time situational awareness under the ever-evolving cyberthreat landscape. Advances in snapshot-based system identification approaches have enabled accurately estimating states and topology from a snapshot…
In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show that with the knowledge of the system configuration an…
In the recent years cyberattacks to smart grids are becoming more frequent Among the many malicious activities that can be launched against smart grids False Data Injection FDI attacks have raised significant concerns from both academia and…
Detection of cyber attacks in smart power distribution grids with unbalanced configurations poses challenges due to the inherent nonlinear nature of these uncertain and stochastic systems. It originates from the intermittent characteristics…
As one of the largest and most complex systems on earth, power grid (PG) operation and control have stepped forward as a compound analysis on both physical and cyber layers which makes it vulnerable to assaults from economic and security…
Systematic attack design is essential to understanding the vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), to better design for resiliency. In particular, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are well-known and have been shown to be…
Deep Neural Networks have proven to be highly accurate at a variety of tasks in recent years. The benefits of Deep Neural Networks have also been embraced in power grids to detect False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) while conducting…
With the proliferation of smart devices and revolutions in communications, electrical distribution systems are gradually shifting from passive, manually-operated and inflexible ones, to a massively interconnected cyber-physical smart grid…
The increasing deployment of Internet-of-Things (IoT)-enabled measurement devices in modern power systems has expanded the cyberattack surface of the grid. As a result, this critical infrastructure is increasingly exposed to cyberattacks,…
Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…
As water distribution networks (WDNs) become increasingly connected with digital infrastructures, they face greater exposure to cyberattacks that threaten their operational integrity. Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks (SFDIAs) are…
The normal operation of power system relies on accurate state estimation that faithfully reflects the physical aspects of the electrical power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully synthesized false-data injection attacks can…
This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…
The stealth of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) against feedback sensors in linear time-varying (LTV) control systems is investigated. In that regard, the following notions of stealth are pursued: For some finite $\epsilon > 0$, i) an…