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Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of FineIBT: a CFI enforcement mechanism that improves the precision of hardware-assisted CFI solutions, like Intel IBT, by instrumenting program code to reduce the valid/allowed targets…
Timing side-channel attacks pose a major threat to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. We propose CIDPro, a framework that relies on dynamic program diversification to mitigate timing side-channel leakage. The proposed…
This paper studies the problem of reasoning about flow security properties in virtualised computing networks with mobility from perspective of formal language. We propose a distributed process algebra CSP_{4v} with security labelled…
Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…
The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines to developers on specific code patterns to use or avoid.…
As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, various defenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware. Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on the same core…
As modern hardware designs grow in complexity and size, ensuring security across the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad becomes increasingly challenging. Information flow tracking (IFT) is a widely-used approach to…
This paper presents a software-based technique to recover control-flow errors in multithreaded programs. Control-flow error recovery is achieved through inserting additional instructions into multithreaded program at compile time regarding…
Control-flow hijacking attacks manipulate orchestration mechanisms in multi-agent systems into performing unsafe actions that compromise the system and exfiltrate sensitive information. Recently proposed defenses, such as LlamaFirewall,…
With the continuous evolution of computational devices, more and more applications are being executed remotely. The applications operate on a wide spectrum of devices, ranging from IoT nodes with low computational capabilities to large…
Recently, code reuse attacks (CRAs), such as return-oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented programming (JOP), have emerged as a new class of ingenious security threatens. Attackers can utilize CRAs to hijack the control flow of…
The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic…
This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…
Prior research yielded many techniques to mitigate software compromise for low-end Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Some of them detect software modifications via remote attestation and similar services, while others preventatively ensure…
Fault localization in modern processor design code is a critical yet time-consuming step during processor verification. While recent advances in LLM-based techniques for module-level hardware design have shown promising results,…
Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art counter-measures,…
Fault injection attacks represent a class of threats that can compromise embedded systems across multiple layers of abstraction, such as system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical implementation.…
This work presents the first design, integration, and evaluation of the standard RISC-V extensions for Control-Flow Integrity (CFI). The Zicfiss and Zicfilp extensions aim at protecting the execution of a vulnerable program from…