Related papers: The NTU Partitioned Matching Game for Internationa…
Kidney paired donation programs allow patients registered with an incompatible donor to receive a suitable kidney from another donor, as long as the latter's co-registered patient, if any, also receives a kidney from a different donor. The…
Matching games naturally generalize assignment games, a well-known class of cooperative games. Interest in matching games has grown recently due to some breakthrough results and new applications. This state-of-the-art survey provides an…
Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching…
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) form an innovative approach to increasing the donor pool through allowing the participation of renal patients together with a willing but incompatible donor. The aim of a KEP is to identify groups of…
The kidney exchange mechanism allows many patient-donor pairs who are otherwise incompatible with each other to come together and exchange kidneys along a cycle. However, due to infrastructure and legal constraints, kidney exchange can only…
We study the parameterized complexity of a recently introduced multi-agent variant of the Kidney Exchange problem. Given a directed graph $G$ and integers $d$ and $k$, the standard problem asks whether $G$ contains a packing of…
In kidney exchange programmes patients with end-stage renal failure may exchange their willing, but incompatible living donors among each other. National kidney exchange programmes are in operation in ten European countries, and some of…
Kidney exchange is a barter market where patients trade willing but medically incompatible donors. These trades occur via cycles, where each patient-donor pair both gives and receives a kidney, and via chains, which begin with an altruistic…
A kidney exchange program, also called a kidney paired donation program, can be viewed as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic algorithm for transplant exchange selection may have superior…
In Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs), each participating patient is registered together with an incompatible donor. Donors without an incompatible patient can also register. Then, KEPs typically maximize overall patient benefit through donor…
Kidney exchange programs among hospitals in the United States and across European countries improve efficiency by pooling donors and patients on a centralized platform. Sustaining such cooperation requires stability. When the core is empty,…
Kidney Exchange Programmes (KEPs) facilitate the exchange of kidneys, and larger pools of recipient-donor pairs tend to yield proportionally more transplants, leading to the proposal of international KEPs (IKEPs). However, as studied by…
The kidney paired donation (KPD) program provides an innovative solution to overcome incompatibility challenges in kidney transplants by matching incompatible donor-patient pairs and facilitating kidney exchanges. To address unequal access…
An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively…
This paper proposes a novel algorithm to approximate the core of transferable utility (TU) cooperative games via linear programming. Given the computational hardness of determining the full core, our approach provides a tractable…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the…
This paper introduces a new learning-based approach for approximately solving the Kidney-Exchange Problem (KEP), an NP-hard problem on graphs. The problem consists of, given a pool of kidney donors and patients waiting for kidney donations,…
In a housing market of Shapley and Scarf, each agent is endowed with one indivisible object and has preferences over all objects. An allocation of the objects is in the (strong) core if there exists no (weakly) blocking coalition. In this…
Background: The kidney exchange problem (KEP) addresses the matching of patients in need for a replacement organ with compatible living donors. Ideally many medical institutions should participate in a matching program to increase the…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…