Related papers: Satisficing Equilibrium
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…
As we show using the notion of equilibrium in the theory of infinite sequential games, bubbles and escalations are rational for economic and environmental agents, who believe in an infinite world. This goes against a vision of a self…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
We develop an equilibrium framework that relaxes the standard assumption that people have a correctly-specified view of their environment. Each player is characterized by a (possibly misspecified) subjective model, which describes the set…
Autonomous and learning agents increasingly participate in markets - setting prices, placing bids, ordering inventory. Such agents are not just aiming to optimize in an uncertain environment; they are making decisions in a game-theoretical…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…
A multi-agent system operates in an uncertain environment about which agents have different and time varying beliefs that, as time progresses, converge to a common belief. A global utility function that depends on the realized state of the…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…