Related papers: Preference-Based Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learnin…
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are widely prevalent and crucially important in numerous real-world applications, where multiple agents must make decisions to achieve their objectives in a shared environment. Despite their ubiquity, the…
Standard multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms are vulnerable to sim-to-real gaps. To address this, distributionally robust Markov games (RMGs) have been proposed to enhance robustness in MARL by optimizing the worst-case…
We study reinforcement learning from human feedback in general Markov decision processes, where agents learn from trajectory-level preference comparisons. A central challenge in this setting is to design algorithms that select informative…
The deployment of multi-agent systems in dynamic, adversarial environments like robotic soccer necessitates real-time decision-making, sophisticated cooperation, and scalable algorithms to avoid the curse of dimensionality. While…
We characterize offline data poisoning attacks on Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), where an attacker may change a data set in an attempt to install a (potentially fictitious) unique Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for a two-player…
Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow…
We formulate computation offloading as a decentralized decision-making problem with autonomous agents. We design an interaction mechanism that incentivizes agents to align private and system goals by balancing between competition and…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
A reinforcement learning agent tries to maximize its cumulative payoff by interacting in an unknown environment. It is important for the agent to explore suboptimal actions as well as to pick actions with highest known rewards. Yet, in…
An internet network service provider manages its network with multiple objectives, such as high quality of service (QoS) and minimum computing resource usage. To achieve these objectives, a reinforcement learning-based (RL) algorithm has…
Agent-based models (ABMs) have shown promise for modelling various real world phenomena incompatible with traditional equilibrium analysis. However, a critical concern is the manual definition of behavioural rules in ABMs. Recent…
In reinforcement learning, we typically refer to unsupervised pre-training when we aim to pre-train a policy without a priori access to the task specification, i.e. rewards, to be later employed for efficient learning of downstream tasks.…
In preference-based reinforcement learning (PbRL), a reward function is learned from a type of human feedback called preference. To expedite preference collection, recent works have leveraged \emph{offline preferences}, which are…
Offline preference-based reinforcement learning (PbRL) provides an effective way to overcome the challenges of designing reward and the high costs of online interaction. However, since labeling preference needs real-time human feedback,…
Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) algorithms, trained only to optimize task reward, can lead to a concentration of power where the failure or adversarial intent of a single agent could decimate the reward of every agent…
Multi-agent robust reinforcement learning, also known as multi-player robust Markov games (RMGs), is a crucial framework for modeling competitive interactions under environmental uncertainties, with wide applications in multi-agent systems.…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
The results of a learning process depend on the input data. There are cases in which an adversary can strategically tamper with the input data to affect the outcome of the learning process. While some datasets are difficult to attack, many…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
Non-stationarity poses a fundamental challenge in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), arising from agents simultaneously learning and altering their policies. This creates a non-stationary environment from the perspective of each…