Related papers: Non-uniformly Stable Matchings
We provide explicit conditions for uniform stability, global asymptotic stability and uniform exponential stability for dynamic equations with a single delay and a nonnegative coefficient. Some examples on nonstandard time scales are also…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
The dynamical behavior of switched affine systems is known to be more intricate than that of the well-studied switched linear systems, essentially due to the existence of distinct equilibrium points for each subsystem. First, under…
We study the structure of the set of priority-neutral matchings. These matchings, introduced by Reny (AER, 2022), generalize stable matchings by allowing for priority violations in a principled way that enables Pareto-improvements to stable…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
In this letter, by regarding finite-time stability as an inverse problem, we reveal the essence of finite-time stability and fixed-time stability. Some necessary and sufficient conditions are given. As application, we give a new approach…
The stability problem of a class of nonlinear switched systems defined on compact sets with state-dependent switching is considered. Instead of the Caratheodory solutions, the general Filippov solutions are studied. This encapsulates…
It is shown that a compound elastic structure, which displays a dynamic instability, may be designed as the union (or 'fusion') of two structures which are stable when separately analyzed. The compound elastic structure has two degrees of…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
This work deals with the stability analysis of nonlinear sampled-data systems under nonuniform sampling. It establishes novel relationships between the stability property of the exact discrete-time model for a given sequence of (aperiodic)…
A noncommutative polynomial is stable if it is nonsingular on all tuples of matrices whose imaginary parts are positive definite. In this paper a characterization of stable polynomials is given in terms of strongly stable linear matrix…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
This paper is concerned with the stability analysis of continuous-time switched systems with a random switching signal. The switching signal manifests its characteristics with that the dwell time in each subsystem consists of a fixed part…
In IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncrossing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two parallel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They defined two stability…
We analyze the stability of a non-Hermitian coupler with respect to modulational inhomogeneous perturbations in the presence of unbalanced gain and loss. At the parity-time (PT) symmetry point the coupler is unstable. Suitable symmetry…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…