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Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is a powerful tool for training autonomous agents acting independently in a common environment. However, it can lead to sub-optimal behavior when individual incentives and group incentives diverge.…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning is a challenging and active field of research due to the inherent nonstationary property and coupling between agents. A popular approach to modeling the multi-agent interactions underlying the multi-agent…
Self-play, a learning paradigm where agents iteratively refine their policies by interacting with historical or concurrent versions of themselves or other evolving agents, has shown remarkable success in solving complex non-cooperative…
While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has produced numerous algorithms that converge to Nash or related equilibria, such equilibria are often non-unique and can exhibit widely varying efficiency. This raises a fundamental…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint…
Various methods for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) have been developed with the assumption that agents' policies are based on accurate state information. However, policies learned through Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) are…
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…
Agent-based models (ABMs) are simulation models used in economics to overcome some of the limitations of traditional frameworks based on general equilibrium assumptions. However, agents within an ABM follow predetermined 'bounded rational'…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms often struggle to find strategies close to Pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium, owing largely to the lack of efficient exploration. The problem is exacerbated in sparse-reward settings,…
Reinforcement learning has increasingly been applied to economic decision-making, including taxation, public spending, and labor supply. However, existing RL-based economic models typically consider only a single government-household group,…
Coordination is one of the essential problems in multi-agent systems. Typically multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods treat agents equally and the goal is to solve the Markov game to an arbitrary Nash equilibrium (NE) when…
In competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods based on the \emph{Double Oracle (DO)} algorithm, such as \emph{Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO)} and \emph{Anytime PSRO (APSRO)}, iteratively add RL best…
This paper presents an algorithmic framework for learning robust policies in asymmetric imperfect-information games, where the joint reward could depend on the uncertain opponent type (a private information known only to the opponent itself…
Federated learning offers a decentralized approach to machine learning, where multiple agents collaboratively train a model while preserving data privacy. In this paper, we investigate the decision-making and equilibrium behavior in…
Many large-scale platforms and networked control systems have a centralized decision maker interacting with a massive population of agents under strict observability constraints. Motivated by such applications, we study a cooperative Markov…
Zero-shot coordination problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), which requires agents to adapt to unseen agents, has attracted increasing attention. Traditional approaches often rely on the Self-Play (SP) framework to generate…
We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
We have used agent-based modeling as our numerical method to artificially simulate a dynamic real economy where agents are rational maximizers of an objective function of Cobb-Douglas type. The economy is characterised by heterogeneous…