Related papers: Verifying Approximate Equilibrium in Auctions
Visualization dashboards are increasingly used in strategic settings like auctions to enhance decision-making and reduce strategic confusion. This paper presents behavioral experiments evaluating how different dashboard designs affect bid…
We study simple and approximately optimal auctions for agents with a particular form of risk-averse preferences. We show that, for symmetric agents, the optimal revenue (given a prior distribution over the agent preferences) can be…
The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However,…
In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied…
In this paper we study the problem of allocating a scarce resource among several players (or agents). A central decision maker wants to maximize the total utility of all agents. However, such a solution may be unfair for one or more agents…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
One method to offer some bidders a discount in a first-price auction is to augment their bids when selecting a winner but only charge them their original bids should they win. Another method is to use their original bids to select a winner,…
We consider the fundamental scenario where a single item is to be sold to one of two agents. Both agents draw their valuation for the item from the same probability distribution. However, only one of them submits a bid to the mechanism. The…
We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller $i$ to effectively ``freeze'' their price while remaining active in the auction, and…
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
Maximizing utility with a budget constraint is the primary goal for advertisers in real-time bidding (RTB) systems. The policy maximizing the utility is referred to as the optimal bidding strategy. Earlier works on optimal bidding strategy…
We propose a simple yet effective solution to tackle the often-competing goals of fairness and utility in classification tasks. While fairness ensures that the model's predictions are unbiased and do not discriminate against any particular…
We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
Advertisement auctions play a crucial role in revenue generation for e-commerce companies. To make the bidding procedure scalable to thousands of auctions, the automatic bidding (autobidding) algorithms are actively developed in the…
Auctions are key for maximizing sellers' revenue and ensuring truthful bidding among buyers. Recently, an approach known as differentiable economics based on machine learning (ML) has shown promise in learning powerful auction mechanisms…
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set of payoff comparisons they can make, and use it to…