Related papers: Undominated monopoly regulation
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonotonic$ mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valuation one. Here we show that the restriction to $monotonic$…
I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who can acquire it at cost, and a strategic lobbyist who wishes…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
In this paper, we consider a stochastic recursive optimal control problem under model uncertainty. In this framework, the cost function is described by solutions of a family of backward stochastic differential equations. With the help of…
We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…
We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated and how regulation should evolve with new information. An adaptive sandbox comprising a zero marginal tax up to an evolving quantity limit is (i) robust: it delivers optimal…
This contribution examines optimization problems that involve stochastic dominance constraints. These problems have uncountably many constraints. We develop methods to solve the optimization problem by reducing the constraints to a finite…
We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite…
Herding, where investors imitate others' decisions rather than relying on their own analysis, is a prevalent phenomenon in financial markets. Excessive herding distorts rational decisions, amplifies volatility, and can be exploited by…
From economics point of view, we investigate a new optimal control problem driven by a stochastic differential equation with a multi-time states cost functional. By constructing a series of first-order adjoint equations, we establish the…
In this paper, we investigate a decentralized control problem with nested subsystems, which is a general model for one-directional communication amongst many subsystems. The noises in our dynamics are modelled as uncertain variables which…
We are concerned with optimal control strategies subject to uncertain demands. An Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process describes the uncertain demand. The transport within the supply system is modeled by the linear advection equation. We consider…
We consider the optimal control of quantum systems interacting non-linearly with an electromagnetic field. We propose new monotonically convergent algorithms to solve the optimal equations. The monotonic behavior of the algorithm is ensured…
Control systems involving unknown parameters appear a natural framework for applications in which the model design has to take into account various uncertainties. In these circumstances the performance criterion can be given in terms of an…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
We apply marginal analysis \`a la Bulow and Roberts (1989) to characterize revenue-maximizing selling mechanisms for a multiproduct monopoly. We derive marginal revenue from price perturbations over arbitrary sets of bundles and show that…
A seller offers a buyer a schedule of transfers and associated product qualities. After observing this schedule, the buyer chooses a flexible costly signal about his type. We show it is without loss to focus on a class of mechanisms that…
A sender with private preferences would like to influence a receiver's action by providing information through a statistical test. The technology for information production is controlled by a monopolist intermediary, who offers a menu of…
We study the problem of designing optimal auctions under restrictions on the set of permissible allocations. In addition to allowing us to restrict to deterministic mechanisms, we can also indirectly model non-additive valuations. We prove…