Related papers: A Geometric Nash Approach in Tuning the Learning R…
One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…
This paper introduces an approach to Reinforcement Learning Algorithm by comparing their immediate rewards using a variation of Q-Learning algorithm. Unlike the conventional Q-Learning, the proposed algorithm compares current reward with…
Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm…
Q-Learning is a fundamental off-policy reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm that has the objective of approximating action-value functions in order to learn optimal policies. Nonetheless, it has difficulties in reconciling bias with…
We study whether the learning rate $\alpha$, the discount factor $\gamma$ and the reward signal $r$ have an influence on the overestimation bias of the Q-Learning algorithm. Our preliminary results in environments which are stochastic and…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
Q-learning is a stochastic approximation version of the classic value iteration. The literature has established that Q-learning suffers from both maximization bias and slower convergence. Recently, multi-step algorithms have shown practical…
The optimistic nature of the Q-learning target leads to an overestimation bias, which is an inherent problem associated with standard $Q-$learning. Such a bias fails to account for the possibility of low returns, particularly in risky…
Q-learning suffers from overestimation bias, because it approximates the maximum action value using the maximum estimated action value. Algorithms have been proposed to reduce overestimation bias, but we lack an understanding of how bias…
We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…
This paper considers risk-averse learning in convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their individual risk of incurring significantly high costs. Specifically, the agents adopt the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with strongly monotone pseudo-gradients and jointly linear coupling constraints. We establish the convergence rate of a payoff-based approach intended to learn a variational…
Q-learning is a regression-based approach that is widely used to formalize the development of an optimal dynamic treatment strategy. Finite dimensional working models are typically used to estimate certain nuisance parameters, and…
We derive the rate of convergence to the strongly variationally stable Nash equilibrium in a convex game, for a zeroth-order learning algorithm. Though we do not assume strong monotonicity of the game, our rates for the one-point feedback…
In classical Q-learning, the objective is to maximize the sum of discounted rewards through iteratively using the Bellman equation as an update, in an attempt to estimate the action value function of the optimal policy. Conventionally, the…
In deep learning tasks, the learning rate determines the update step size in each iteration, which plays a critical role in gradient-based optimization. However, the determination of the appropriate learning rate in practice typically…
We use co-evolutionary genetic algorithms to model the players' learning process in several Cournot models, and evaluate them in terms of their convergence to the Nash Equilibrium. The "social-learning" versions of the two co-evolutionary…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
Model-free reinforcement learning algorithms, such as Q-learning, perform poorly in the early stages of learning in noisy environments, because much effort is spent unlearning biased estimates of the state-action value function. The bias…
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…