Related papers: Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over So…
This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We assume that a good allocation algorithm exists when given the…
Online auction scenarios, such as bidding searches on advertising platforms, often require bidders to participate repeatedly in auctions for identical or similar items. Most previous studies have only considered the process by which the…
We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide concrete convergence rates for auctions in this class,…
Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical \emph{utility…
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…
Auctions are important mechanisms extensively implemented in various markets, e.g., search engines' keyword auctions, antique auctions, etc. Finding an optimal auction mechanism is extremely difficult due to the constraints of imperfect…
We study whether large language models acting as autonomous bidders can tacitly collude by coordinating when to accept platform posted payouts in repeated Dutch auctions, without any communication. We present a minimal repeated auction…
This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism…
Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone…
In traditional machine learning, the central server first collects the data owners' private data together and then trains the model. However, people's concerns about data privacy protection are dramatically increasing. The emerging paradigm…
In combinatorial auctions, a designer must decide how to allocate a set of indivisible items amongst a set of bidders. Each bidder has a valuation function which gives the utility they obtain from any subset of the items. Our focus is…
One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for combinatorial…
We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a…
We study an auction setting in which bidders bid for placement of their content within a summary generated by a large language model (LLM), e.g., an ad auction in which the display is a summary paragraph of multiple ads. This generalizes…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize the \emph{liquid welfare}, a notion of efficiency for…
This paper studies a wireless network where multiple users cooperate with each other to improve the overall network performance. Our goal is to design an optimal distributed power allocation algorithm that enables user cooperation, in…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
This paper studies mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets, a novel setting where the budgets that bidders commit are adjusted due to the externality of the competitors' allocation outcomes-a departure from traditional…
In this era of "Services" everywhere, with the explosive growth of E-Commerce and B2B transactions, there is a pressing need for the development of intelligent negotiation systems which consists of feasible architecture, a reliable…