Related papers: Bargaining via Weber's law
Negotiation is a process where agents aim to work through disputes and maximize their surplus. As the use of deep reinforcement learning in bargaining games is unexplored, this paper evaluates its ability to exploit, adapt, and cooperate to…
We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…
In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…
We consider two-player non-zero-sum linear-quadratic Gaussian games in which both players aim to minimize a quadratic cost function while controlling a linear and stochastic state process {using linear policies}. The system is partially…
In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…
Two-person bargaining problem is considered as to allocate a number of goods between two players. This paper suggests that any non-trivial division of goods cause a non-zero change on the solution of bargaining. So, a axiom of sharing…
Consider discrete-time linear distributed averaging dynamics, whereby agents in a network start with uncorrelated and unbiased noisy measurements of a common underlying parameter (state of the world) and iteratively update their estimates…
A recently introduced concept of "cooperative equilibrium", based on the assumption that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicting human behaviour in social dilemmas. In this paper, we…
We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where…
This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users over a Gaussian interference channel. The usual information theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection. In the scenario…
This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users over a Gaussian interference channel using game theory. The usual information theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection.…
This study proposes a novel solution concept--the w-value--for cooperative games with public externalities. The w-value is axiomatically founded on three principles: Pareto Optimality (PO), Market Equilibrium (ME), and Fiscal Balance (FB),…
In this paper, we propose a bilateral peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme under single-contract and multi-contract market setups, both as an assignment game, and a special class of coalitional games. {The proposed market formulation…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
Forecast reconciliation is considered an effective method to achieve coherence (within a forecast hierarchy) and to improve forecast quality. However, the value of reconciled forecasts in downstream decision-making tasks has been mostly…
We study optimal portfolio choice models in markets with partial information about the stock's drift. We solve the single agent problem for general utilities using a new approach that yields regularity of the value function and closed form…
A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock…
This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…