Related papers: Persuading an inattentive and privately informed r…
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…
The ability to persuade others is critical to professional and personal success. However, crafting persuasive messages is demanding and poses various challenges. We conducted nine exploratory case studies to identify adaptations that…
This paper examines a commonly used measure of persuasion whose precise interpretation has been obscure in the literature. By using the potential outcome framework, we define the causal persuasion rate by a proper conditional probability of…
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…
Appropriate decisions depend on information gathered beforehand, yet such information is often obtained through intermediaries with biased preferences. Motivated by settings such as testing and recertification in organ transplantation, we…
How to incentivize self-interested agents to explore when they prefer to exploit? Consider a population of self-interested agents that make decisions under uncertainty. They "explore" to acquire new information and "exploit" this…
In many settings -- like market research and social choice -- people may be presented with unfamiliar options. Classical mechanisms may perform poorly because they fail to incentivize people to learn about these options, or worse, encourage…
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally…
Many experiments elicit subjects' prior and posterior beliefs about a random variable to assess how information affects one's own actions. However, beliefs are multi-dimensional objects, and experimenters often only elicit a single response…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender…
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…
Previous work has showcased the intriguing capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in instruction-following and rhetorical fluency. However, systematic exploration of their dual capabilities to autonomously persuade and resist…
I study a principal-agent model in which a principal hires an agent to collect information about an unknown continuous state. The agent acquires a signal whose distribution is centered around the state, controlling the signal's precision at…
Communication is secret if a message is independent of the state; however, the receiver's subsequent action may still reveal that she has acted on hidden information. This paper studies when secret communication can also provide plausible…
Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
Persuasion can be a complex process. Persuaders may need to use a high degree of sensitivity to understand a persuadee's states, traits, and values. They must navigate the nuanced field of human interaction. Research on persuasive systems…
We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…
The goal of this article is to investigate how human participants allocate their limited time to decisions with different properties. We report the results of two behavioral experiments. In each trial of the experiments, the participant…
Persuasion is part and parcel of human interaction. The human persuaders in society have been always exit, masters of rhetoric skilled of changing our minds, or at least our behaviors. Leaders, mothers, salesmen, and teachers are clear…