Related papers: Distribution Aggregation via Continuous Thiele's R…
Abel-Tauberian theorems relate power law behavior of distributions and their transforms. We formulate and prove a multivariate version for non-standard regularly varying measures on $\mathbb{R}_+^p$ and then apply it to prove that the joint…
The productivity of a common pool of resources may degrade when overly exploited by a number of selfish investors, a situation known as the tragedy of the commons (TOC). Without regulations, agents optimize the size of their individual…
This paper addresses the distributed Nash Equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games, where legitimate players' decisions are affected by potential malicious players. To describe players' behavior, we introduce a novel heterogeneous…
The Shapley-Folkman theorem shows that Minkowski averages of uniformly bounded sets tend to be convex when the number of terms in the sum becomes much larger than the ambient dimension. In optimization, Aubin and Ekeland [1976] show that…
We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share (MMS) fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods. Given an instance with $n$ agents and $m$ goods, we ask how many copies of the goods should be added in…
We describe an adaptive greedy algorithm for Thiele continued-fraction approximation of a function defined on a continuum domain in the complex plane. The algorithm iteratively selects interpolation nodes from an adaptively refined set of…
In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we…
A set of $m$ indivisible goods is to be allocated to a set of $n$ agents. Each agent $i$ has an additive valuation function $v_i$ over goods. The value of a good $g$ for agent $i$ is either $1$ or $s$, where $s$ is a fixed rational number…
Standard uniform convergence results bound the generalization gap of the expected loss over a hypothesis class. The emergence of risk-sensitive learning requires generalization guarantees for functionals of the loss distribution beyond the…
Fair division is the problem of dividing one or several goods amongst two or more agents in a way that satisfies a suitable fairness criterion. These Notes provide a succinct introduction to the field. We cover three main topics. First, we…
We establish a Nash equilibrium in a market with $ N $ agents with the performance criteria of relative wealth level when the market return is unobservable. Each investor has a random prior belief on the return rate of the risky asset. The…
This paper considers coverage games in which a group of agents are tasked with identifying the highest-value subset of resources; in this context, game-theoretic approaches are known to yield Nash equilibria within a factor of 2 of optimal.…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…
We investigate the efficiency of fair allocations of indivisible goods using the well-studied price of fairness concept. Previous work has focused on classical fairness notions such as envy-freeness, proportionality, and equitability.…
Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing balance…
In order to properly manage risk, practitioners must understand the aggregate risks they are exposed to. Additionally, to properly price policies and calculate bonuses the relative riskiness of individual business units must be well…
A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock…
We consider the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating a set $\mathcal{G}$ of indivisible goods to a set $\mathcal{N}$ of agents. We study instances, in which all agents have 2-value additive valuations: The value of…
We study the monotonicity properties of solutions in the classic problem of fair cake-cutting --- dividing a heterogeneous resource among agents with different preferences. Resource- and population-monotonicity relate to scenarios where the…
We prove a central limit theorem for stationary multiple (random) fields of martingale differences $f\circ T_{\underline{i}}$, $\underline{i}\in \Bbb Z^d$, where $T_{\underline{i}}$ is a $\Bbb Z^d$ action. In most cases the multiple…