Related papers: Certifying Lemons

This paper studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their tastes to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a…

Weakly supervised data are widespread and have attracted much attention. However, since label quality is often difficult to guarantee, sometimes the use of weakly supervised data will lead to unsatisfactory performance, i.e., performance…

Partial multi-label learning and complementary multi-label learning are two popular weakly supervised multi-label classification paradigms that aim to alleviate the high annotation costs of collecting precisely annotated multi-label data.…

We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We…

Institutional crossing platforms face a hidden-information problem: investors value trades as portfolios, but liquidity discovery is typically organized around individual securities. We model portfolio crossing as limited-communication…

We propose a communication game in the sequential measurement scenario, involving a sender and two receivers with restricted communication among the latter parties. In the framework of the prepare-transform-measure scenario, we find a…

In addition to their benefits, optimization systems can have negative economic, moral, social, and political effects on populations as well as their environments. Frameworks like fairness have been proposed to aid service providers in…

This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…

This paper studies the value of a firm's internal information when the firm faces an adverse selection problem arising from unobservable managerial abilities. While more precise information allows the firm to make ex post more efficient…

Certified defenses against small-norm adversarial examples have received growing attention in recent years; though certified accuracies of state-of-the-art methods remain far below their non-robust counterparts, despite the fact that…

A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…

Generative AI is transforming the provision of expert services. This article uses a series of one-shot experiments to quantify the behavioral, welfare and distribution consequences of large language models (LLMs) on AI-AI, Human-Human,…

This paper analyzes a cheap-talk model with multiple senders and one receiver. Each sender observes a noisy signal about an unknown state and sends a message; the receiver observes the message tally and chooses a policy. This setting shares…

In most practical problems of classifier learning, the training data suffers from the label noise. Hence, it is important to understand how robust is a learning algorithm to such label noise. This paper presents some theoretical analysis to…

In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…

Local certification is a topic originating from distributed computing, where a prover tries to convince the vertices of a graph $G$ that $G$ satisfies some property $\mathcal{P}$. To convince the vertices, the prover gives a small piece of…

I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I…

A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents), which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the question whether using undesirable goods…

Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal…

Methods to certify the robustness of neural networks in the presence of input uncertainty are vital in safety-critical settings. Most certification methods in the literature are designed for adversarial or worst-case inputs, but researchers…