Related papers: Certifying Lemons

This paper examines competitive information disclosure in search markets with a mix of savvy consumers, who search costlessly, and inexperienced consumers, who face positive search costs. Savvy consumers incentivize truthful disclosure;…

Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…

In guaranteeing the absence of adversarial examples in an instance's neighbourhood, certification mechanisms play an important role in demonstrating neural net robustness. In this paper, we ask if these certifications can compromise the…

A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad…

In many cases, assessing the quality of goods is hard. For example, when purchasing a car, it is hard to measure how pollutant the car is since there are infinitely many driving conditions to be tested. Typically, these situations are…

This paper studies the provision of a wireless network by a monopolistic provider who may be either benevolent (seeking to maximize social welfare) or selfish (seeking to maximize provider profit). The paper addresses questions that do not…

We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…

A benevolent advisor observes a project's complexity and posts a pass - fail threshold before the agent chooses effort. The project succeeds only if ability and effort together clear complexity. We compare two informational regimes. In the…

Discrimination can occur when the underlying unbiased labels are overwritten by an agent with potential bias, resulting in biased datasets that unfairly harm specific groups and cause classifiers to inherit these biases. In this paper, we…

The performance of a reinforcement learning algorithm can vary drastically during learning because of exploration. Existing algorithms provide little information about the quality of their current policy before executing it, and thus have…

In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…

We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…

An employer contracts with a worker to incentivize efforts whose productivity depends on ability; the worker then enters a market that pays him contingent on ability evaluation. With non-additive monitoring technology, the interdependence…

A seller offers a buyer a schedule of transfers and associated product qualities. After observing this schedule, the buyer chooses a flexible costly signal about his type. We show it is without loss to focus on a class of mechanisms that…

Machine learning models play a key role for service providers looking to gain market share in consumer markets. However, traditional learning approaches do not take into account the existence of additional providers, who compete with each…

A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments…

AI consumer markets are characterized by severe buyer-supplier market asymmetries. Complex AI systems can appear highly accurate while making costly errors or embedding hidden defects. While there have been regulatory efforts surrounding…

A defining feature of digital goods is that replication and degradation are costless: once a high-quality good is produced, low-quality versions can be created and distributed at no additional cost. This paper studies quality-based…

This paper investigates third-degree price discrimination under endogenous market segmentation. Segmenting a market requires access to information about consumers, and this information comes with a cost. I explore the trade-offs between the…

Machine learning actively impacts our everyday life in almost all endeavors and domains such as healthcare, finance, and energy. As our dependence on the machine learning increases, it is inevitable that these algorithms will be used to…