Related papers: Stochastic Games with Minimally Bounded Action Cos…
We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite graph for infinitely many rounds. Stochastic games generalize both Markov decision processes (MDP) by adding an adversary player, and two-player deterministic games by adding…
We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…
We study decentralized equilibrium selection in stochastic games under severe information and communication constraints. In such settings, convergence to equilibrium alone is insufficient, as stochastic games typically admit many equilibria…
The study of learning in games typically assumes that each player always has access to all of their actions. However, in many practical scenarios, players' available actions might be restricted due to exogenous stochasticity. To model this…
We study nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with risk-sensitive ergodic cost criterion. Under certain conditions, using multi-parameter eigenvalue approach, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the space of stationary…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We consider mean field games with ergodic cost in the framework of a general discrete time controlled Markov processes. The state space of the processes is given by a general $\sigma$-compact Polish space. Under certain conditions, we show…
Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modelling the cost of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the…
In this paper we consider long-run risk sensitive average cost impulse control applied to a continuous-time Feller-Markov process. Using the probabilistic approach, we show how to get a solution to a suitable continuous-time Bellman…
We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
We devise an optimal allocation strategy for the execution of a predefined number of stocks in a given time frame using the technique of discrete-time Stochastic Control Theory for a defined market model. This market structure allows an…
We study online reinforcement learning in average-reward stochastic games (SGs). An SG models a two-player zero-sum game in a Markov environment, where state transitions and one-step payoffs are determined simultaneously by a learner and an…
It is well known that the (unique) value of a stochastic control problem or a two person zero sum game under Isaacs condition can be characterized through a PDE driven by the Hamiltonian. Our goal of this paper is to extend this classical…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…
Certain but important classes of strategic-form games, including zero-sum and identical-interest games, have the fictitious-play-property (FPP), i.e., beliefs formed in fictitious play dynamics always converge to a Nash equilibrium (NE) in…
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…
In this paper, we study infinite-horizon linear-quadratic uncertain differential games with an output feedback information structure. We assume linear time-invariant nominal dynamics influenced by deterministic external disturbances, and…
There are only a few learning algorithms applicable to stochastic dynamic teams and games which generalize Markov decision processes to decentralized stochastic control problems involving possibly self-interested decision makers. Learning…
The mathematical characterization of social-distancing games in classical epidemic theory remains an important question, for their applications to both infectious-disease theory and memetic theory. We consider a special case of the dynamic…