Related papers: q-deformed evolutionary dynamics in simple matrix …

We study the rock-paper-scissors game in structured populations, where the invasion rates determine individual payoffs that govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version of the game is recovered if the payoffs for each…

Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an…

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…

Evolutionary spatial 2 x 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 x 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two…

Various social dilemma games that follow different strategy updating rules have been studied on many networks.The reported results span the entire spectrum, from significantly boosting,to marginally affecting,to seriously decreasing the…

The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…

This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the $d$-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one…

We study the dynamics of evolution of points of agents placed in the vertices of a graph within the rules of two-agent units of competition where an edge is randomly chosen and the agent with higher points gets a new point with a…

A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2 x 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire…

We introduce novel multi-agent interaction models of entropic spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary undisclosed games and their quasi-static limits. These evolutions vastly generalize first and second order dynamics. Besides the…

While actors in a population can interact with anyone else freely, social relations significantly influence our inclination towards particular individuals. The consequence of such interactions, however, may also form the intensity of our…

Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…

The environment undergoes perpetual changes that are influenced by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Consequently, it exerts a substantial influence on an individual's physical and psychological state, directly or…

We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy…

We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…

We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…

We develop a minimal, timeless game-theoretic representation of the mass-geometry relation. An "Object" (mass) and "Space" (geometry) choose strategies in a static normal-form game; utilities encode stability as mutual consistency rather…