Related papers: SENTAUR: Security EnhaNced Trojan Assessment Using…

The recent surge in hardware security is significant due to offshoring the proprietary Intellectual property (IP). One distinct dimension of the disruptive threat is malicious logic insertion, also known as Hardware Trojan (HT). HT subverts…

Traditionally, inserting realistic Hardware Trojans (HTs) into complex hardware systems has been a time-consuming and manual process, requiring comprehensive knowledge of the design and navigating intricate Hardware Description Language…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, driven by time-to-market and cost considerations, has made ICs vulnerable to hardware Trojans (HTs). Against this threat, a promising approach is to use Machine Learning…

Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…

Existing Hardware Trojans (HT) detection methods face several critical limitations: logic testing struggles with scalability and coverage for large designs, side-channel analysis requires golden reference chips, and formal verification…

Hardware Trojans (HT s) are a persistent threat to integrated circuits, especially when inserted at the register-transfer level (RTL). Existing methods typically first convert the design into a graph, such as a gate-level netlist or an…

Chip manufacturing is a complex process, and to achieve a faster time to market, an increasing number of untrusted third-party tools and designs from around the world are being utilized. The use of these untrusted third party intellectual…

Automating hardware (HW) security vulnerability detection and mitigation during the design phase is imperative for two reasons: (i) It must be before chip fabrication, as post-fabrication fixes can be costly or even impractical; (ii) The…

Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework that automatically…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities around the world. The risk of using…

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Electronic Design Automation (EDA) and hardware security is rapidly reshaping the semiconductor industry. While LLMs offer unprecedented capabilities in generating Register Transfer Level…

Current Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are mostly developed based on a limited set of HT benchmarks. Existing HT benchmark circuits are generated with multiple shortcomings, i.e., i) they are heavily biased by the designers'…

This paper presents a real-time modular defense system named Sentra-Guard. The system detects and mitigates jailbreak and prompt injection attacks targeting large language models (LLMs). The framework uses a hybrid architecture with…

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly fine-tuned for hardware tasks like RTL code generation, the scarcity of high-quality datasets often leads to the use of rapidly assembled or generated training data. These datasets frequently…

Third-party intellectual property cores are essential building blocks of modern system-on-chip and integrated circuit designs. However, these design components usually come from vendors of different trust levels and may contain undocumented…

Economic and operational advantages have led the supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) to incorporate various untrusted entities. Any of the untrusted entities are capable of introducing malicious alterations to facilitate a…

There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan…

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a new paradigm of building natural language processing (NLP) systems: general-purpose, pre-trained language models (LMs) are composed with simple downstream models and fine-tuned for a variety of…

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist,…

Analog and mixed-signal (A/MS) integrated circuits (ICs) are integral to safety-critical applications. However, the globalization and outsourcing of A/MS ICs to untrusted third-party foundries expose them to security threats, particularly…