Related papers: Does Refusal Training in LLMs Generalize to the Pa…

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to refuse harmful instructions through safety fine-tuning. A recent attack, termed abliteration, identifies and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior,…

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful…

This paper introduces FRACTURED-SORRY-Bench, a framework for evaluating the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) against multi-turn conversational attacks. Building upon the SORRY-Bench dataset, we propose a simple yet effective method…

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated that fine-tuning and human alignment can render LLMs harmless. In practice, such "harmlessness" behavior is mainly achieved by training models to reject harmful requests,…

This study reveals a previously unexplored vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). Existing aligned LLMs predominantly respond to unsafe queries with refusals, which often begin with a fixed set of prefixes…

Large Language Models (LLMs) undergo continuous updates to improve user experience. However, prior research on the security and safety implications of LLMs has primarily focused on their specific versions, overlooking the impact of…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to be susceptible to crafted adversarial attacks or jailbreaks that lead to the generation of objectionable content despite being aligned to human preferences using safety fine-tuning methods. While…

Large language models (LLMs) are designed to align with human values in their responses. This study exploits LLMs with an iterative prompting technique where each prompt is systematically modified and refined across multiple iterations to…

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success at tasks like summarization that involve a single turn of interaction. However, they can still struggle with multi-turn tasks like dialogue that require long-term planning.…

Refusal on harmful prompts is a key safety behaviour in instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs), yet the internal causes of this behaviour remain poorly understood. We study two public instruction-tuned models, Gemma-2-2B-IT and…

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to jailbreaking attacks. Several primary defense strategies have been proposed to protect LLMs from producing harmful…

Recent advances in the development of large language models have resulted in public access to state-of-the-art pre-trained language models (PLMs), including Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3 (GPT-3) and Bidirectional Encoder…

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized zero-shot task performance, mitigating the need for task-specific annotations while enhancing task generalizability. Despite its advancements, current methods using trigger phrases such as…

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse…

Despite advances in AI alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks or jailbreaking, in which adversaries can modify prompts to induce unwanted behavior. While some defenses have been proposed, they have…

In an era where large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into a wide range of everyday applications, research into these models' behavior has surged. However, due to the novelty of the field, clear methodological guidelines…

We introduce Tempest, a multi-turn adversarial framework that models the gradual erosion of Large Language Model (LLM) safety through a tree search perspective. Unlike single-turn jailbreaks that rely on one meticulously engineered prompt,…

Although many large language models (LLMs) have been trained to refuse harmful requests, they are still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks which rewrite the original prompt to conceal its harmful intent. In this paper, we propose a new…

Previous learning-based vulnerability detection methods relied on either medium-sized pre-trained models or smaller neural networks from scratch. Recent advancements in Large Pre-Trained Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable…

Ensuring the safety and alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values is crucial for generating responses that are beneficial to humanity. While LLMs have the capability to identify and avoid harmful queries, they remain…