Related papers: Faster and Smaller Solutions of Obliging Games
Recent successes of game-theoretic formulations in ML have caused a resurgence of research interest in differentiable games. Overwhelmingly, that research focuses on methods and upper bounds on their speed of convergence. In this work, we…
We consider turn-based game arenas for which we investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve bundles of plays, that arise from some semantical motive. Typically, we can represent constraints on allowed…
Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
We compare games under delayed control and delay games, two types of infinite games modelling asynchronicity in reactive synthesis. In games under delayed control both players suffer from partial informedness due to symmetrically delayed…
Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an…
We lay out a model of games with imperfect information that features explicit communication actions, by which the entire observation history of a player is revealed to another player. Such full-information protocols are common in…
Multi-dimensional mean-payoff and energy games provide the mathematical foundation for the quantitative study of reactive systems, and play a central role in the emerging quantitative theory of verification and synthesis. In this work, we…
In recent years, agents have become capable of communicating seamlessly via natural language and navigating in environments that involve cooperation and competition, a fact that can introduce social dilemmas. Due to the interleaving of…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…
A modern approach to engineering correct-by-construction systems is to synthesize them automatically from formal specifications. Oftentimes, a system can only satisfy its guarantees if certain environment assumptions hold, which motivates…
We address a central (and classical) issue in the theory of infinite games: the reduction of the memory size that is needed to implement winning strategies in regular infinite games (i.e., controllers that ensure correct behavior against…
We propose the concept of a Lagrangian game to solve constrained Markov games. Such games model scenarios where agents face cost constraints in addition to their individual rewards, that depend on both agent joint actions and the evolving…
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…
Recent advancements in algorithms for sequential decision-making under imperfect information have shown remarkable success in large games such as limit- and no-limit poker. These algorithms traditionally formalize the games using the…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
Social institutions are systems of shared norms and rules that regulate people's behaviors, often emerging without external enforcement. They provide criteria to distinguish cooperation from defection and establish rules to sustain…
Many security and other real-world situations are dynamic in nature and can be modelled as strictly competitive (or zero-sum) dynamic games. In these domains, agents perform actions to affect the environment and receive observations --…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models, while…