Related papers: Popular Maximum-Utility Matchings with Matroid Con…
We consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in a many-to-many matching setting with two-sided preferences and matroid constraints. This problem was proposed by Kamiyama (2020) and solved in the special case where matroids…
Popularity is an approach in mechanism design to find fair structures in a graph, based on the votes of the nodes. Popular matchings are the relaxation of stable matchings: given a graph G=(V,E) with strict preferences on the neighbors of…
In a graph where vertices have preferences over their neighbors, a matching is called popular if it does not lose a head-to-head election against any other matching when the vertices vote between the matchings. Popular matchings can be seen…
In the Popular Matching problem, we are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$ and for each vertex $v\in A\cup B$, strict preferences over the neighbors of $v$. Given two matchings $M$ and $M'$, matching $M$ is more popular than $M'$…
Popular matchings provide a model of matching under preferences in which a solution corresponds to a Condorcet winner in voting systems. In a bipartite graph in which the vertices have preferences over their neighbours, a matching is…
Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G$ where every vertex has a capacity and a strict preference order on its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a cost function on the edge set. We assume $G$ admits a perfect matching, i.e.,…
Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any…
We consider the max-size popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' in G such that the vertices that prefer M' to M outnumber those that prefer…
Let $G$ be a bipartite graph where every node has a strict ranking of its neighbors. For every node, its preferences over neighbors extend naturally to preferences over matchings. Matching $N$ is more popular than matching $M$ if the number…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$ where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every $a \in A$ ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of $b \in B$…
In the popular edge problem, the input is a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B,E)$ where $A$ and $B$ denote a set of men and a set of women respectively, and each vertex in $A\cup B$ has a strict preference ordering over its neighbours. A…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
Our input is a complete graph $G = (V,E)$ on $n$ vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in $G$. Our goal is to construct a matching in $G$ that is popular. A matching $M$ is popular if $M$ does not lose a…
We study the problem of assigning jobs to applicants. Each applicant has a weight and provides a preference list ranking a subset of the jobs. A matching M is popular if there is no other matching M' such that the weight of the applicants…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
For a set A of n applicants and a set I of m items, we consider a problem of computing a matching of applicants to items, i.e., a function M mapping A to I; here we assume that each applicant $x \in A$ provides a preference list on items in…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…