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A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
Flaws of a continuous limit order book mechanism raise the question of whether a continuous trading session and a periodic auction session would bring better efficiency. This paper wants to go further in designing a periodic auction when…
The energetic flexibility of electric energy resources can be exploited when trading on wholesale energy and ancillary service markets. This paper considers the problem of a Balance Responsible Party to maximize its profit from trading on…
A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I…
The European Union Emission Trading System is a prominent market-based mechanism to reduce emissions. While the theory is well understood, we are the first to study the whole cap-and-trade mechanism as a financial market. Analyzing the…
Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…
In emissions trading, the initial allocation of permits is an intractable issue because it needs to be essentially fair to the participating countries. There are many ways to distribute a given total amount of emissions permits among…
Existing emissions trading system (ETS) designs inhibit emissions but do not constrain warming to any fxed level, preventing certainty of the global path of warming. Instead, they have the indirect objective of reducing emissions. They…
Carbon pricing has become a central pillar of modern climate policy, with carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETS) serving as the two dominant approaches. Although economic theory suggests these instruments are equivalent under…
The growing integration of renewable energy sources necessitates adequate reserve capacity to maintain power balance. However, in market clearing, power companies with flexible resources may submit strategic bids to maximize profits,…
Second-price auctions with reserve play a critical role for modern search engine and popular online sites since the revenue of these companies often directly de- pends on the outcome of such auctions. The choice of the reserve price is the…
Tackling climate change is at the top of many agendas. In this context, emission trading schemes are considered as promising tools. The regulatory framework for an emission trading scheme introduces a market for emission allowances and…
The aim of this paper is to address the effect of the carbon emission allowance market on the production policy of a large polluter production firm. We investigate this effect in two cases; when the large polluter cannot affect the risk…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
Energy storage (ES) can help decarbonize power systems by transferring green renewable energy across time. How to unlock the potential of ES in cutting carbon emissions by appropriate market incentives has become a crucial, albeit…
Most modern ticketing systems rely on a first-come-first-serve or randomized allocation system to determine the allocation of tickets. Such systems has received considerable backlash in recent years due to its inequitable allotment and…
Emissions markets play a vital role in emissions reduction by incentivizing firms to minimize costs. However, their effectiveness heavily depends on the decisions of policymakers, future economic activity, and the availability of abatement…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…
Second-price auctions with deposits are frequently used in blockchain environments. An auction takes place on-chain: bidders deposit an amount that fully covers their bid (but possibly exceeds it) in a smart contract. The deposit is used as…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…