Related papers: Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets
We give a new, flow-type convex program describing equilibrium solutions to linear Arrow-Debreu markets. Whereas convex formulations were previously known [Nenakov, Primak 83; Jain 07; Cornet '89], our program exhibits several new features.…
Learning and adaptation play great role in emergent socio-economic phenomena. Complex dynamics has been previously found in the systems of multiple learning agents interacting via a simple game. Meanwhile, the single agent adaptation is…
Various formulations of counterfactual general equilibrium in economies -- systems of actors manipulating economic goods -- are logically and mathematically analyzed. Evenly-rotating economies are systems whose evolution is stable, steady,…
Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…
We develop a dynamic model of cascading failures in a financial network whereby cross-holdings are viewed as feedback, external assets investments as inputs and failure penalties as static nonlinearities. We provide sufficient milder and…
Most finance studies are discussed on the basis of several hypotheses, for example, investors rationally optimize their investment strategies. However, the hypotheses themselves are sometimes criticized. Market impacts, where trades of…
Motivated by the growing requirements on the operation of complex engineering systems, we present contracts as specifications for continuous-time linear dynamical systems with inputs and outputs. A contract is defined as a pair of…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
We propose a framework for studying the stability of discrete-event systems modelled as switching max-plus linear systems. In this framework, we propose a set of notions of stability for generic discrete-event systems in the max-plus…
In this work, we consider ranking problems among a finite set of candidates: for instance, selecting the top-$k$ items among a larger list of candidates or obtaining the full ranking of all items in the set. These problems are often…
Stability is a fundamental notion in dynamical systems and control theory that, traditionally understood, describes asymptotic behavior of solutions around an equilibrium point. This notion may be characterized abstractly as continuity of a…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
This paper addresses the problem of stabilization for infinite-dimensional systems. In particular, we design nonlinear stabilizers for both linear and nonlinear abstract systems. We focus on two classes of systems: the first class comprises…
We obtain sufficient conditions for the stability of the synchronized solutions for a class of coupled dynamical systems. This is accomplished by finding an analytical expression for the transverse Liapunov exponent through spectral…
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
Many algorithms have been proposed in prior literature to guarantee resilient multi-agent consensus in the presence of adversarial attacks or faults. The majority of prior work present excellent results that focus on discrete-time or…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
Hierarchical task decomposition is a method used in many agent systems to organize agent knowledge. This work shows how the combination of a hierarchy and persistent assertions of knowledge can lead to difficulty in maintaining logical…