Related papers: Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Price Coll…
As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of…
The successes of Artificial Intelligence in recent years in areas such as image analysis, natural language understanding and strategy games have sparked interest from the world of finance. Specifically, there are high expectations, and…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework,…
I develop a theoretical model to examine how the rise of autonomous AI (artificial intelligence) agents disrupts two-sided digital advertising markets. Through this framework, I demonstrate that users' rational, private decisions to…
We study the problem of online dynamic pricing with two types of fairness constraints: a "procedural fairness" which requires the proposed prices to be equal in expectation among different groups, and a "substantive fairness" which requires…
We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between…
We consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in practice for allocating goods such as carbon licenses. In each round, $K$ identical units of a good are sold to a group of buyers that have valuations…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is…
When human agents come together to make decisions, it is often the case that one human agent has more information than the other. This phenomenon is called information asymmetry and this distorts the market. Often if one human agent intends…
Motivated by agentic markets -- two-sided markets in which consumers and businesses are assisted by AI tools that facilitate consumers' search -- we study the impact of improved search technology on learning and welfare in markets. We put…
We study the problem of collaborative machine learning markets where multiple parties can achieve improved performance on their machine learning tasks by combining their training data. We discuss desired properties for these machine…
Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit…
Despite rapid technological progress, effective human-machine cooperation remains a significant challenge. Humans tend to cooperate less with machines than with fellow humans, a phenomenon known as the machine penalty. Here, we show that…
Single-agent reinforcement learning algorithms in a multi-agent environment are inadequate for fostering cooperation. If intelligent agents are to interact and work together to solve complex problems, methods that counter non-cooperative…
As AI agents are increasingly adopted to collaborate on complex objectives, ensuring the security of autonomous multi-agent systems becomes crucial. We develop simulations of agents collaborating on shared objectives to study these security…
Despite high-profile successes in the field of Artificial Intelligence, machine-driven technologies still suffer important limitations, particularly for complex tasks where creativity, planning, common sense, intuition, or learning from…
Modern AI systems increasingly operate inside markets and institutions where data, behavior, and incentives are endogenous. This paper develops an economic foundation for multi-agent learning by studying a principal-agent interaction in a…
Traditional competitive markets do not account for negative externalities; indirect costs that some participants impose on others, such as the cost of over-appropriating a common-pool resource (which diminishes future stock, and thus…
We propose a multi-agent distributed reinforcement learning algorithm that balances between potentially conflicting short-term reward and sparse, delayed long-term reward, and learns with partial information in a dynamic environment. We…