Related papers: Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores
We study fair division of indivisible items under a variable input setting, where the set of agents or items may change over time. Starting from an arbitrary allocation, the goal is to restore envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) through item…
We study the problem of dynamically allocating $T$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with the restriction that the allocation is fair all the time. Due to the negative results to achieve fairness when allocations are irrevocable, we allow…
We consider the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with possibly different weights, aiming for a solution that is both fair and efficient. Specifically, we focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality…
We consider the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among agents having valuations that are represented by a multi-graph -- here, agents appear as vertices and items as edges between them and each vertex…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores under ordinal valuations for agents with unequal entitlements. We show the existence and polynomial time computation of weighted necessarily proportional up to one item…
We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations of goods and chores have some fundamental connections…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as envy-freeness, which states that no agent should…
We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations, aiming for Best-of-Both-Worlds (BoBW) fairness: a distribution over allocations that is ex-ante fair, and additionally, it is supported…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an…
Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or divisible, it is impossible to…
We study a resource allocation setting where $m$ discrete items are to be divided among $n$ agents with additive utilities, and the agents' utilities for individual items are drawn at random from a probability distribution. Since common…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The fair division literature has traditionally focused on two broad classes of fairness notions: envy-based notions and share-based notions. Within the…
In the budget-feasible allocation problem, a set of items with varied sizes and values are to be allocated to a group of agents. Each agent has a budget constraint on the total size of items she can receive. The goal is to compute a…
In the allocation of indivisible goods, a prominent fairness notion is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We initiate the study of reachability problems in fair division by investigating the problem of whether one EF1 allocation can be…
We study the fair allocation of a cake, which serves as a metaphor for a divisible resource, under the requirement that each agent should receive a contiguous piece of the cake. While it is known that no finite envy-free algorithm exists in…
This work addresses fair allocation of indivisible items in settings wherein it is feasible to create copies of resources or dispose of tasks. We establish that exact maximin share (MMS) fairness can be achieved via limited duplication of…
This paper re-examines the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive bivalued valuations. Garg and Murhekar (2021) proposed a polynomial-time algorithm that purported to find an EFX and fPO…