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We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…
Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of…
Entanglement is of paramount importance in quantum information theory. Its supremacy over classical correlations has been demonstrated in numerous information theoretic protocols. Here we study possible adequacy of quantum entanglement in…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…
When deploying artificial agents in real-world environments where they interact with humans, it is crucial that their behavior is aligned with the values, social norms or other requirements of that environment. However, many environments…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
We consider the problem of regulating products with negative externalities to a third party that is neither the buyer nor the seller, but where both the buyer and seller can take steps to mitigate the externality. The motivating example to…
In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items…
The reliability and security of a user in an interconnected system depends on all users' collective effort in security. Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic users is typically modeled as a public good problem,…
A natural goal in multiagent learning besides finding equilibria is to learn rationalizable behavior, where players learn to avoid iteratively dominated actions. However, even in the basic setting of multiplayer general-sum games, existing…
We propose a continuous-time nonlinear model of opinion dynamics with utility-maximizing agents connected via a social influence network. A distinguishing feature of the proposed model is the inclusion of an opinion-dependent…
Methods for learning optimal policies in autonomous agents often assume that the way the domain is conceptualised---its possible states and actions and their causal structure---is known in advance and does not change during learning. This…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
When robots share the same workspace with other intelligent agents (e.g., other robots or humans), they must be able to reason about the behaviors of their neighboring agents while accomplishing the designated tasks. In practice,…
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…
Betting games provide a natural setting to capture how information yields strategic advantage. The Kelly criterion for betting, long a cornerstone of portfolio theory and information theory, admits an interpretation in the limit of…
We consider the problem of repeatedly choosing policies to maximize social welfare. Welfare is a weighted sum of private utility and public revenue. Earlier outcomes inform later policies. Utility is not observed, but indirectly inferred.…
The notion of \emph{policy regret} in online learning is a well defined? performance measure for the common scenario of adaptive adversaries, which more traditional quantities such as external regret do not take into account. We revisit the…
In this paper, we study multi-agent systems with decentralized resource allocations. Agents have local demand and resource supply, and are interconnected through a network designed to support sharing of the local resource; and the network…
Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept that captures strategic interaction in electricity market analysis. However, it requires a fundamental but impractical assumption that all market participants are fully rational, implying…