Related papers: Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theo…
The Coase Theorem has a central place in the theory of environmental economics and regulation. But its applicability for solving real-world externality problems remains debated. In this paper, we first place this seminal contribution in its…
Consider a cost-sharing game with players of different contribution to the total cost: an example might be an insurance company calculating premiums for a population of mixed-risk individuals. Two natural and competing notions of fairness…
The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous, undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be…
Optimization is widely used for decision making across various domains, valued for its ability to improve efficiency. However, poor implementation practices can lead to unintended consequences, particularly in socioeconomic contexts where…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
Most of the existing algorithms for fair division do not consider externalities. Under externalities, the utility an agent obtains depends not only on its allocation but also on the allocation of other agents. An agent has a positive…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
This study proposes a novel solution concept--the w-value--for cooperative games with public externalities. The w-value is axiomatically founded on three principles: Pareto Optimality (PO), Market Equilibrium (ME), and Fiscal Balance (FB),…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
This paper examines optimal risk sharing for empirically realistic risk attitudes, providing results on Pareto optimality, competitive equilibria, utility frontiers, and the first and second theorems of welfare. Contrary to common…
Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…
Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents…
In a social network, agents are intelligent and have the capability to make decisions to maximize their utilities. They can either make wise decisions by taking advantages of other agents' experiences through learning, or make decisions…
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this…
The robustness of multiagent systems can be affected by mistakes or behavioral biases (e.g., risk-aversion, altruism, toll-sensitivity), with some agents playing the "wrong game." This can change the set of equilibria, and may in turn harm…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
The biased interaction game described the operation of systems rooted in boundedly rational interactions under conditions of scarcity. The game explored the influence of bias and demonstrated how hierarchy and inequality are emergent system…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…