Related papers: A Zero Auxiliary Knowledge Membership Inference At…

Small language models (SLMs) are increasingly valued for their efficiency and deployability in resource-constrained environments, making them useful for on-device, privacy-sensitive, and edge computing applications. On the other hand,…

Membership inference attacks (MIA) aim to infer whether a particular data point is part of the training dataset of a model. In this paper, we propose a new task in the context of LLM privacy: entity-level discovery of membership risk…

Tabular data synthesis using diffusion models has gained significant attention for its potential to balance data utility and privacy. However, existing privacy evaluations often rely on heuristic metrics or weak membership inference attacks…

Deep learning models, while achieving remarkable performances, are vulnerable to membership inference attacks (MIAs). Although various defenses have been proposed, there is still substantial room for improvement in the privacy-utility…

The high cost of model training makes it increasingly desirable to develop techniques for unlearning. These techniques seek to remove the influence of a training example without having to retrain the model from scratch. Intuitively, once a…

Optimization algorithms that seek flatter minima, such as Sharpness-Aware Minimization (SAM), are credited with improved generalization and robustness to noise. We ask whether such gains impact membership privacy. Surprisingly, we find that…

In several jurisdictions, the regulatory framework on the release and sharing of personal data is being extended to machine learning (ML). The implicit assumption is that disclosing a trained ML model entails a privacy risk for any personal…

While in-processing fairness approaches show promise in mitigating biased predictions, their potential impact on privacy leakage remains under-explored. We aim to address this gap by assessing the privacy risks of fairness-enhanced binary…

The lack of data transparency in Large Language Models (LLMs) has highlighted the importance of Membership Inference Attack (MIA), which differentiates trained (member) and untrained (non-member) data. Though it shows success in previous…

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are widely used to empirically assess privacy risks in machine learning models, both providing model-level vulnerability metrics and identifying the most vulnerable training samples. State-of-the-art…

Neural models for vulnerability prediction (VP) have achieved impressive performance by learning from large-scale code repositories. However, their susceptibility to Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs), where adversaries aim to infer…

Membership inference attacks (MIAs), which determine whether a specific data point was included in the training set of a target model, have posed severe threats in federated learning (FL). Unfortunately, existing MIA defenses, typically…

Transfer learning, successful in knowledge translation across related tasks, faces a substantial privacy threat from membership inference attacks (MIAs). These attacks, despite posing significant risk to ML model's training data, remain…

The rapid advancement of diffusion-based image generation models has raised serious concerns regarding potential copyright and privacy infringements involving human-created data. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) have emerged as a…

Membership inference attacks aim to detect if a particular data point was used in training a model. We design a novel statistical test to perform robust membership inference attacks (RMIA) with low computational overhead. We achieve this by…

The use of synthetic data has become increasingly popular as a privacy-preserving alternative to sharing real datasets, especially in sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and demography. However, the privacy assurances of…

Most existing membership inference attacks (MIAs) utilize metrics (e.g., loss) calculated on the model's final state, while recent advanced attacks leverage metrics computed at various stages, including both intermediate and final stages,…

For small privacy parameter $\epsilon$, $\epsilon$-differential privacy (DP) provides a strong worst-case guarantee that no membership inference attack (MIA) can succeed at determining whether a person's data was used to train a machine…

In Embedding-as-an-Interface (EaaI) settings, pre-trained models are queried for Intermediate Representations (IRs). The distributional properties of IRs can leak training-set membership signals, enabling Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs)…

Traditional machine learning (ML) raises serious privacy concerns, while federated learning (FL) mitigates the risk of data leakage by keeping data on local devices. However, the training process of FL can still leak sensitive information,…