Related papers: Hiring and firing -- a signaling game

We consider a continuous time stochastic dynamic game between a stopper (Player $1$, the \textit{owner} of an asset yielding an income) and a controller (Player $2$, the \textit{manager} of the asset), where the manager is either effective…

The off-switch problem is a critical challenge in AI control: if an AI system resists being switched off, it poses a significant risk. In this paper, we model the off-switch problem as a signalling game, where a human decision-maker…

Even in the face of deteriorating and highly volatile demand, firms often invest in, rather than discard, aging technologies. In order to study this phenomenon, we model the firm's profit stream as a Brownian motion with negative drift. At…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…

We consider a natural dynamic staffing problem in which a decision-maker sequentially hires workers over a finite horizon to meet an unknown demand revealed at the end. Predictions about demand arrive over time and become increasingly…

We study a dynamic labor market in which a risk-averse worker with career concerns chooses each period between self-employment, which generates publicly observed binary output, and employment at a firm, which pays a flat wage but keeps…

In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and…

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…

When recruiting job candidates, employers rarely observe their underlying skill level directly. Instead, they must administer a series of interviews and/or collate other noisy signals in order to estimate the worker's skill. Traditional…

An employer contracts with a worker to incentivize efforts whose productivity depends on ability; the worker then enters a market that pays him contingent on ability evaluation. With non-additive monitoring technology, the interdependence…

We solve two stochastic control problems in which a player tries to minimize or maximize the exit time from an interval of a Brownian particle, by controlling its drift. The player can change from one drift to another but is subject to a…

In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing…

We investigate the hiring problem where a sequence of applicants is sequentially interviewed, and a decision on whether to hire an applicant is immediately made based on the applicant's score. For the maximal and average improvement…

We establish that statistical discrimination is possible if and only if it is impossible to uniquely identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realized empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical…

A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…

This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…

Wage dispersion and job-to-job mobility are central features of modern labour markets, yet canonical equilibrium search models with exogenous job-offer ladders struggle to jointly account for these facts and the magnitude of frictional wage…

We revisit the classic job-market signaling model of \cite{spence1973job}, introducing profit-seeking schools as intermediaries that design the mapping from candidates' efforts to job-market signals. Each school commits to an attendance fee…

We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric…