Related papers: Fast, optimal, and dynamic electoral campaign budg…
We introduce a new variation of the m-player asymmetric Colonel Blotto game, where the n battles occur as sequential stages of the game, and the winner of each stage needs to spend resources for maintaining his win. The limited resources of…
This paper explores the Nash equilibria of a variant of the Colonel Blotto game, which we call the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game. In the Colonel Blotto game, two players simultaneously distribute forces across $n$ battlefields. Within each…
In this work we successfully present a quantum version of the multiplayer Colonel Blotto game. We find that players with access to the quantum strategies has a advantage over the classical ones. The payoff is invariant under the order of…
We examine the problem of efficiently learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in polyhedral games, that is, normal-form games with an exponentially large number of actions per player and an underlying combinatorial structure. Prominent…
When a centrally operated ride-hailing company considers to enter a market already served by another company, it has to make a strategic decision about how to distribute its fleet among different regions in the area. This decision will be…
We propose an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria (NE) in a class of conflicts with multiple battlefields with uniform battlefield values and a non-linear aggregation function. By expanding the symmetrization idea of Hart [9], proposed…
In this paper, we investigate the multiplayer General Lotto game across multiple battlefields, a significant variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employs a probability distribution for resource allocation,…
This work studies a dynamic, adversarial resource allocation problem in environments modeled as graphs. A blue team of defender robots are deployed in the environment to protect the nodes from a red team of attacker robots. We formulate the…
Two-stage Colonel Blotto game represents a typical adversarial resource allocation problem, in which two opposing agents sequentially allocate resources in a network topology across two phases: an initial resource deployment followed by…
Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…
Game-theoretic resource allocation on graphs (GRAG) involves two players competing over multiple steps to control nodes of interest on a graph, a problem modeled as a multi-step Colonel Blotto Game (MCBG). Finding optimal strategies is…
We study the problem of game-theoretic robot allocation where two players strategically allocate robots to compete for multiple sites of interest. Robots possess offensive or defensive capabilities to interfere and weaken their opponents to…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
Competitive influence maximization has been studied for several years, and various frameworks have been proposed to model different aspects of information diffusion under the competitive environment. This work presents a new gameboard for…
We study candidates' positioning when adjustments are possible in response to new information about voters' preferences. Re-positioning allows candidates to get closer to the median voter but is costly both financially and electorally. We…
In competitive resource allocation environments, agents often choose to form alliances; however, for some agents, doing so may not always be beneficial. Is there a method of forming alliances that always reward each of their members? We…
Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-making policies is a level of unpredictability, or randomness,…
The game of best choice (also known as the secretary problem) is a model for sequential decision making with a long history and many variations. The classical setup assumes that the sequence of candidate rankings are uniformly distributed.…
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted…
We study strategic candidate positioning in multidimensional spatial-voting elections. Voters and candidates are represented as points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, and each voter supports the candidate that is closest under a distance induced by an…