Related papers: A counterexample to conjecture "Catch 22"

Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…

We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework,…

For any two-by-two game $\G$, we define a new two-player game $\G^Q$. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game $\G$ communicating via quantum technology according to a certain standard protocol originally introduced by…

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…

Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory,…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…

We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…

We introduce and investigate certain $N$ player dynamic games on the line and in the plane that admit Coulomb gas dynamics as a Nash equilibrium. Most significantly, we find that the universal local limit of the equilibrium is sensitive to…

In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For…

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…

The two-players N strategies games quantized according to the Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens scheme [1] are considered. It is shown that in the case of maximal entanglement no nontrivial pure Nash equilibrium exists. The proof relies on simple…

In this paper, I prove that existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games with infinitely many players is equivalent to the axiom of choice.

In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a network, in which edges are equipped with transit times, specifying the traversing time, and with capacities, restricting flow rates.…

Dynamic games are powerful tools to model multi-agent decision-making, yet computing Nash (generalized Nash) equilibria remains a central challenge in such settings. Complexity arises from tightly coupled optimality conditions, nested…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities…

We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…