Related papers: Redistribution Through Market Segmentation
We study price regulation for a monopolist operating in networked markets with demand spillovers. Achieving efficiency requires price reductions proportional to consumers' Katz-Bonacich centralities, which generally cannot be implemented by…
We study the revenue maximization problem with an imprecisely estimated distribution of a single buyer or several independent and identically distributed buyers given that this estimation is not far away from the true distribution. We use…
Dworczak et al. (2021) study when certain market structures are optimal in the presence of heterogeneous preferences. A key assumption is that the social planner knows the joint distribution of the value of the good and marginal value of…
In this paper, we propose a distributed control strategy for the design of an energy market. The method relies on a hierarchical structure of aggregators for the coordination of prosumers (agents which can produce and consume energy). The…
Inheritances, divorces or liquidations of companies require common assets to be divided among the entitled parties. Legal methods usually consider the market value of goods, while fair division theory takes into account the parties'…
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of…
In this work, we study a new approach to optimizing the margin distribution realized by binary classifiers. The classical approach to this problem is simply maximization of the expected margin, while more recent proposals consider…
We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling $m$ items to a buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we…
A monopoly platform sells either a risky product (with unknown utility) or a safe product (with known utility) to agents who sequentially arrive and learn the utility of the risky product by the reporting of previous agents. It is costly…
A distributed, hierarchical, market based approach is introduced to solve the economic dispatch problem. The approach requires only a minimal amount of information to be shared between a central market operator and the end-users. Price…
Pricing decisions are often made when market information is still poor. In turn, existing theoretical models often reason about the response of optimal prices to changing market characteristics without exploiting all available information…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
In this paper, a novel distributed optimization framework has been proposed. The key idea is to convert optimization problems into optimal control problems where the objective of each agent is to design the current control input minimizing…
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…
Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a…
We consider the problem of how to regulate an oligopoly when firms have private information about their costs. In the environment, consumers make discrete choices over goods, and minimal structure is placed on the manner in which firms…
Introduction of market mechanisms in distribution systems is currently subject to extensive studies. One of the challenges facing Distribution Market Operators (DMOs) is to implement a fair and economically efficient pricing mechanism that…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
We study undominated mechanisms with transfers for regulating a monopolist who privately observes the marginal cost of production. We show that in any undominated mechanism, there is a quantity floor, which depends only on the primitives,…
We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite…