Related papers: Tractable Equilibrium Computation in Markov Games …

Classical game-theoretic approaches for multi-agent systems in both the forward policy design problem and the inverse reward learning problem often make strong rationality assumptions: agents perfectly maximize expected utilities under…

In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

This paper addresses the problem of learning an equilibrium efficiently in general-sum Markov games through decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the fundamental difficulty of calculating a Nash equilibrium (NE), we…

We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…

We study robust Markov games (RMG) with $s$-rectangular uncertainty. We show a general equivalence between computing a robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) of a $s$-rectangular RMG and computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of an appropriately…

In an inverse game problem, one needs to infer the cost function of the players in a game such that a desired joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We study the inverse game problem for a class of multiplayer matrix games, where the cost…

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…

In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…

The interplay between exploration and exploitation in competitive multi-agent learning is still far from being well understood. Motivated by this, we study smooth Q-learning, a prototypical learning model that explicitly captures the…

Autonomous driving (AD) requires safe and reliable decision-making among interacting agents, e.g., vehicles, bicycles, and pedestrians. Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) modeled by Markov games (MGs) provides a suitable framework to…

A growing line of work reframes preference-based fine-tuning of large language models game-theoretically: Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) recasts the problem as a zero-sum game over policies. However, optimization is over expected…

Standard multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms are vulnerable to sim-to-real gaps. To address this, distributionally robust Markov games (RMGs) have been proposed to enhance robustness in MARL by optimizing the worst-case…

Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems. We ask whether weakening optimality to the requirement…

Solution concepts such as Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria are useful components for many multiagent machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, solving a normal-form game could take prohibitive or…

Markov games (MGs) and multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) are studied to model decision making in multi-agent systems. Traditionally, the objective in MG and MARL has been risk-neutral, i.e., agents are assumed to optimize a…

We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization…

This paper explores advanced topics in complex multi-agent systems building upon our previous work. We examine four fundamental challenges in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL): non-stationarity, partial observability, scalability…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

The term rational has become synonymous with maximizing expected payoff in the definition of the best response in Nash setting. In this work, we consider stochastic games in which players engage only once, or at most a limited number of…