Related papers: An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additi…
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with…
This paper studies markets where a set of indivisible items is sold to bidders with quasilinear, unit-demand valuations, subject to a hard budget constraint. Without financial constraints the well-known assignment market model of Shapley…
We give new characterizations of core imputations for the following games: * The assignment game. * Concurrent games, i.e., general graph matching games having non-empty core. * The unconstrained bipartite $b$-matching game (edges can be…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new…
We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
We introduce the competitive assignment problem, a two-player version of the well-known assignment problem. Given a set of tasks and a set of agents with different efficiencies for different tasks, Alice and Bob take turns picking agents…
The Shapley value is the prevalent solution for fair division problems in which a payout is to be divided among multiple agents. By adopting a game-theoretic view, the idea of fair division and the Shapley value can also be used in machine…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…
In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretical models useful to design marketing channels attribution mechanisms based on cooperative TU games and bankruptcy problems, respectively. First, we analyse the Sum Game, a coalitional…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning is an area of rapid advancement in artificial intelligence and machine learning. One of the important questions to be answered is how to conduct credit assignment in a multi-agent system. There have been…