Related papers: Submodular Participatory Budgeting
We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network influence the success of players in the other network. We…
Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget…
Harsanyi (1955) showed that the only way to aggregate individual preferences into a social preference which satisfies certain desirable properties is ``utilitarianism'', whereby the social utility function is a weighted average of…
The questions in a crowdsourcing task typically exhibit varying degrees of difficulty and subjectivity. Their joint effects give rise to the variation in responses to the same question by different crowd-workers. This variation is low when…
Many important collective decision-making problems can be seen as multi-agent versions of discrete optimisation problems. Participatory budgeting, for instance, is the collective version of the knapsack problem; other examples include…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…
A differentially private selection algorithm outputs from a finite set the item that approximately maximizes a data-dependent quality function. The most widely adopted mechanisms tackling this task are the pioneering exponential mechanism…
In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex…
When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum of voters' utilities) and coverage (the number of…
Submodular functions have been a powerful mathematical model for a wide range of real-world applications. Recently, submodular functions are becoming increasingly important in machine learning (ML) for modelling notions such as information…
Budgetary constraints force organizations to pursue only a subset of possible innovation projects. Identifying which subset is most promising is an error-prone exercise, and involving multiple decision makers may be prudent. This raises the…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…
We initiate the study of the proportionality degree for participatory budgeting, with a particular focus on two popular methods: the Method of Equal Shares (MES) and Phragmen's Sequential Rule. Among other results, we derive tight bounds…
Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct one-step…
In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we…
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…
Current alignment pipelines presume a single, universal notion of desirable behavior. However, human preferences often diverge across users, contexts, and cultures. As a result, disagreement collapses into the majority signal and minority…
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent…
Recent literature in the last Maximum Entropy workshop introduced an analogy between cumulative probability distributions and normalized utility functions. Based on this analogy, a utility density function can de defined as the derivative…