Related papers: Strategy-proof Selling: a Geometric Approach

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of…

We model a market in which nonstrategic vendors sell items of different types and offer bundles at discounted prices triggered by demand volumes. Each buyer acts strategically in order to maximize her utility, given by the difference…

We characterize single-item auction formats that are shill-proof in the sense that a profit-maximizing seller has no incentive to submit shill bids. We distinguish between strong shill-proofness, in which a seller with full knowledge of…

We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…

We study the problem of selling a resource through an auction mechanism. The winning buyer in turn develops this resource to generate profit. Two forms of payment are considered: charging the winning buyer a one-time payment, or an initial…

In this paper, we present a new model and two mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments, and is applicable to a wide…

We consider the profit-maximization problem solved by an electricity retailer who aims at designing a menu of contracts. This is an extension of the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem: customers aim to choose a contract maximizing their…

In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian revenue-maximizing mechanism design model where the items have fixed, exogenously-given prices. Buyers are unit-demand and have an ordinal ranking over purchasing either one of these items at its given…

We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated second-price auctions with reserve where a seller interacts with multiple strategic bidders each of which holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his…

Product bundling is a common selling mechanism used in online retailing. To set profitable bundle prices, the seller needs to learn consumer preferences from the transaction data. When customers purchase bundles or multiple products,…

While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…

The goal of this note is to provide a geometric setting in which generalized arithmetic means are best predictors in an appropriate metric. This characterization provides a geometric interpretation to the concept of certainty equivalent.…

Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…

We investigate a seller's revenue-maximizing mechanism in a setting where a desirable good is sold together with an undesirable bad (e.g., advertisements) that generates third-party revenue. The buyer's private information is…

We obtain revenue guarantees for the simple pricing mechanism of a single posted price, in terms of a natural parameter of the distribution of buyers' valuations. Our revenue guarantee applies to the single item n buyers setting, with…

We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…

Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the…

We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an "ambiguity" set. We identify the exact forms of…

We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…